


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8 July 1994



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-94-036

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PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Gaza Mayor Al-Shawwa Interviewed

94AA0074A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 May 94 p 8

[Interview with Gaza Mayor Mansur al-Shawwa by Huda al-Husayni in London; date not given: "In 1983, PLO Rejected Israeli Offer to Turn Over All of Gaza and 70 Percent of West Bank to Arab Authority"—first seven paragraphs are AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction]

[Text] Gaza Mayor Mansur al-Shawwa remembers that he and his father, the late Rashad al-Shawwa, met with Shimon Peres and Yitzhaq Rabin in 1983, in Gaza, in his father's house, to listen to an offer from the Israeli officials to turn over Gaza in its entirety. Not autonomy, but a total withdrawal, and the delivery of Gaza to Arab rule. They offered a total, unconditional pull-out from 70 percent of the West Bank, retaining only a few points they wanted for Israel.

Mansur al-Shawwa adds that he and his father took this offer and contacted several Arab capitals. When they got to the Palestinian command in Tunis, the offer was rejected.

Mansur al-Shawwa pauses a moment to say that he is telling this story "only for the sake of history."

But the refusal may have been because the offer was to turn Gaza and the West Bank over to Arab sovereignty, not to the Palestinians. No, he says: "Aren't we all Arabs? The command refused it for some reason, though our instinct was to accept it and get our land back."

Al-Shawwa recalled this event, and recalled it bitterly, during the interview AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT conducted during his visit to London. The interview with Mansur al-Shawwa took place while the Palestinian police were in Gaza, and the people of Gaza were firing off 25 shots in delight at the Israeli Army's departure from Gaza. The mayor of Gaza corrects me: The Israeli Army withdrew from the cities of Gaza, not from Gaza as a whole. It still controls 50 percent of the public land.

The interview began there, with the agreement, the Gaza-Jericho first agreement. Al-Shawwa calls it "worse than the Balfour Declaration, but we must build on it."

Mansur al-Shawwa talks about the Palestinian police; the district of Jericho, whose area in the days of the Turks was 910 square kilometers, though it is not known whether the agreement has decided to give autonomous Jericho 27 or 62 square kilometers; about the situation in Gaza; settlements; and the West Bank, which the Israelis call Judaea and Samaria, on the basis that the first Jewish state was established there 3,000 years ago.

The text of the interview follows:

[Al-Husayni] May one conclude that the Palestine Liberation Organization has reached an excellent deal with Israel, or is the right thing to go for the return to national soil by any means?

[Al-Shawwa] The fact is that the PLO has made the worst possible deal, but this is the result of the Arab situation in general. They are in a very bad way, and the Palestinian leadership follows the general Arab situation. It concluded the Gaza-Jericho first agreement, which I do not see as equal to Balfour's promise to the Jews in 1917. But we must say that we have made this agreement, and going back on it could be harmful, because the Israelis reached this agreement and have got everything they want by way of it, such as having the world opening up to them. If we renege on it, the world will say, "Look how the Palestinians went back on their word—they don't know what they should be doing." We must build on this agreement. The Israelis built on the Balfour Declaration, and we must build; but we need the right people in the right place.

[Al-Husayni] But so far you don't seem ready. Is it the Palestinians' mistake, or the Israelis'?

[Al-Shawwa] I don't think the leadership was ready, despite the fact that we have been waiting for dozens of years. The leadership was surprised that it was an organization unprepared to take power. What happened on the ground in Gaza is that the Palestinian police forces came in, and even these forces were not funded. It was the people of Gaza who helped to feed and house the police forces. This is a fact, and I know it because I was there.

[Al-Husayni] Where are these forces now?

[Al-Shawwa] Scattered. Their commanders were staying in a hotel, but they left it because it was hard to pay the bill. I gave them a headquarters belonging to the Gaza Strip Charitable Society, which I head. It is a very new office on the beach. Suitable furniture was purchased for them, and they were offered a new car for their movements.

[Al-Husayni] We have seen pictures of individual policemen sleeping on the ground.

[Al-Shawwa] That is a fact, and people gather them chicken, eggs, and vegetables from farms, on top of the needs of the people of Gaza.

[Al-Husayni] Why is it that even now we do not know who the members of the Palestinian government are?

[Al-Shawwa] That is a question I cannot answer. You should ask the leadership. It seems that some of those who were offered posts refused them or held back.

[Al-Husayni] Why, in your view, would they refuse?

[Al-Shawwa] Because they were taking part in the Madrid and Washington negotiations, and then were surprised by the Oslo agreement, reached without their knowledge. They are protesting that, and don't want to take part.

[Al-Husayni] How do the people of Gaza view the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia?

[Al-Shawwa] There is a general dissatisfaction. People want to leave, and to see some change on the ground. The lack of change weakens the PLO's position—it doesn't serve the PLO or our cause. I have said that the agreement is very weak, but we must go along with it. There is no retreat from it.

[Al-Husayni] And if Israel reneges, having benefited globally from this agreement?

[Al-Shawwa] What has Israel done? In actuality, it has abandoned the population centers in the Gaza Strip, and moved to the settlement areas. The Israeli forces have redeployed. There has been no withdrawal. The Israeli Army is now located above the settlements, and has retained 50 percent of the public and government land that should belong to the autonomous authority. After the agreement, they confiscated hundreds of dunams [of land] north of Gaza in the settlement area. They are there, in the north, middle, and south of the Gaza Strip.

[Al-Husayni] You mean there is not one contiguous area, forming a part of self-rule?

[Al-Shawwa] No, no.

[Al-Husayni] How will people get around?

[Al-Shawwa] The Israelis want to be in control, controlling movement, controlling our actions, and our supervision, from afar. They have the right to protest. They control foreign relations, and who enters and who leaves. They control military security; the mission of the Palestinian police is civil order, in the cities.

[Al-Husayni] With these details, what is your interpretation of autonomy?

[Al-Shawwa] It is our administration of certain affairs, such as taxes, municipalities—local—trade, and industry, and that's all.

[Al-Husayni] What about Palestinian territorial waters?

[Al-Shawwa] I have no details about that, but the Israelis govern the sea, and govern Palestinian fishing for 12 kilometers out.

[Al-Husayni] Today (Wednesday) they said that the Israelis completed their pull-out from Gaza...

[Al-Shawwa] ...From the city.

[Al-Husayni] What is the future of the people of Gaza who believe that they have been liberated from 27 years of occupation?

[Al-Shawwa] We have not been liberated from occupation. Today we are given the opportunity to obtain limited autonomy in Gaza, and we, as Gazans and Palestinians, will try to build on that, and to develop the place, which was totally wiped out. The Gaza Strip was totally wrecked. We will try to show that we, as Palestinians, have credibility, but we deserve more. Our rights go beyond Gaza-and-Jericho-First; we deserve more than that, but we will not get it unless we show ourselves to be worthy of what we are asking for.

[Al-Husayni] So far—and begging your pardon—you have not shown yourselves to be worthy. There are no employees there, nor any government in place.

[Al-Shawwa] I cannot disagree with you there. God willing, the PLO leadership will choose the right people for the right jobs in the various departments of the national authority, so that things will get moving.

[Al-Husayni] How were things moving?

[Al-Shawwa] Government offices existed before the 1967 occupation, and afterward, but the Israelis brought in a staff officer for every office. Now the national authority must bring in a staff officer to run the offices. There are Arab employees, and the offices are there, but everything is at a standstill, because orders have to be given for work to begin.

[Al-Husayni] Some people say that the Palestinians in Gaza have surrendered to fate, and that the agreement left them in an almost drugged state.

[Al-Shawwa] Perhaps that is true of the present, but the people of Gaza are not as simple as that. They can be patient a little longer, because of hope, but if things don't get moving, no one knows what might happen in the near future. The most ominous thing is that Israel has, for some reason, pressured us by closing off the border with Gaza, forbidding any worker or any person to travel, unless he has a permit. The permits are hard to get, and the workers, who are the backbone of the Gazan economy, are forbidden from traveling, if it is a question of their traveling into Israel for work; there is nothing in the economic agreement, which is with Israel, and we are ruined. We have no resources.

[Al-Husayni] They are now saying that the workers who want to go daily into Israel for work must first apply for permits from the Palestinian police, and that they will then forward the application to the Israeli police before an answer is given. Are things getting more complicated?

[Al-Shawwa] We hope there is an agreement in principle in the Palestinian-Israeli economic agreement on a specific—and reasonable—number of workers, followed by the details. When the position of the Palestinian police is secure, there will be coordination between both sides, so that things can move along smoothly. We will then be able to provide income to the Gaza Strip, because no one has taken charge of providing a life to the people of Gaza. They must work, and the only practical place for

them to work is in Israel, because for 27 years its economy has been linked to us. We have no independent economy; we were, in effect, an encampment for Israel's workers. The economic link with Israel is irrevocable in the era to come, though we are trying to build an independent economy of some kind. That will take 10 to 15 years.

[Al-Husayni] But 'Arafat says that he wants to make Gaza the Hong Kong of the East, and there are promises of \$2 billion.

[Al-Shawwa] I will say where the 2 billion can be spent in Gaza. Gaza has no infrastructure; it's all destroyed. The municipalities in Gaza are poor; there are no sewers or roads. Our water is polluted, because the Israelis have the sources of the water in the north and south of Gaza, and we want sources of water. We want electricity, because we get electricity from Israel. I estimate that \$2 billion is needed to rebuild the infrastructure of the cities of the Gaza Strip. What will we do with the rest? I am only talking about the infrastructure in Gaza.

There are 900,000 people in Gaza—this is before turning to any other projects. We hope to get the money from many sources.

[Al-Husayni] So the Hong Kong of the East is still far off?

[Al-Shawwa] Yes, far off.

[Al-Husayni] Is this the reason why, after the signing of the agreement in Cairo, the atmosphere in Gaza was so different from the euphoria that followed the signing in Washington?

[Al-Shawwa] They had not seen the details. When they learned the details, they were disappointed. Of course, in Gaza now—the city and the whole area—there is a building boom. Unfortunately I do not understand how people can build on an illusion. There is no infrastructure, no sewers, nothing at all, and yet they are building buildings. Everyone who owns a plot of land is digging and starting to build. None of it is planned—we are living in a period of chaos. It seems to me that this period will last for more than six months, until things become clear.

[Al-Husayni] So, for the next six months the people of Gaza will stay in a state of anxiety and anticipation?

[Al-Shawwa] For sure.

[Al-Husayni] Do you think they fear the future?

[Al-Shawwa] To a large extent. But let me go back and say that the people of Gaza will not leave Gaza. And I say something else—if they do not find a way of getting work, the results will be very dangerous.

[Al-Husayni] Do you sense a civilian insubordination in the face of the Palestinian authority?

[Al-Shawwa] It could go beyond insubordination. When any person's children go hungry, he will kill, he will steal,

he will break every law to feed his children. This is the way people and animals both behave: they will kill to feed their families, and this is what is going to happen, and what I am afraid of, because so far there are no good omens. I am talking about 90,000 workers in the Gaza Strip, the workforce: they have no work in Gaza. They used to work in Israel; now, out of 90,000, about 4,000 or 5,000 go to work in Israel, because of the security encirclement.

[Al-Husayni] Don't you think they discussed this situation in Paris during the economic talks?

[Al-Shawwa] I repeat that the news does not come out all at once. We do not know what went on. I am not a party to the economic talks, and they did not announce everything so that we would know, or so the people would know what to expect.

[Al-Husayni] Speaking of dangers to come, what is behind the phenomenon of the spread of guns among the people of Gaza? Who is behind this?

[Al-Shawwa] The Israelis have encouraged it. They opened up their arms warehouses so that there would be certain types of smuggling. All types of weapons are available in Gaza now. This is the danger that threatens us: the Israelis want there to be bloody conflicts among us. They are betting on fighting among us. I believe that.

[Al-Husayni] All kinds of weapons, or only light arms?

[Al-Shawwa] There are very modern weapons, such as rocket launchers.

[Al-Husayni] There are those who say that in order for peace to succeed, it must provide a guarantee of security for the Israelis and an improvement in the Palestinians' standard of living. Does the autonomous authority, whose composition is still not known, have any way of providing these two things?

[Al-Shawwa] The autonomous authority isn't there. Talk of guaranteeing Israel's security and raising Palestinian living standards is dilatory. Shall I say what the true guarantee of security is? Israel must understand, that while it is strong now, it will not be strong forever; and that if it does not satisfy most of the Palestinians, Israel will always have to bear arms, and this agreement will remain merely an agreement in principle, for it will not succeed long.

Today we are weak, but there are 5 million Palestinians, and the Palestinians are a living people; there is an Arab people to take into account. If Israel wishes to live in the middle of an Arab Middle East, in safety, then it must satisfy most of the Palestinians. Otherwise it will never live in peace. Gradually, they talk about improving conditions for the Palestinians, but what, in reality, have the Palestinians got? One percent of the land of Palestine? Not even 1 percent.

[Al-Husayni] The PLO is your sole legitimate representative, and the PLO agreed to Israeli conditions. Why do

you blame Israel if it merely put forward conditions, which you accepted? Why didn't you refuse?

[Al-Shawwa] The matter was never put to the people, but I repeat that it is the people who will decide in the end what should be done. The authority is, ultimately, mere individuals, and if the sole legitimate leadership has not accomplished what the people expect of it, things will change.

[Al-Husayni] Let's go back to the agreement. According to the agreement, the Palestinian police have no right to arrest or detain any Israeli. It is also stipulated that the Israeli police will cooperate with the Palestinian police in interrogations, and exchange data on suspects, background information, and fingerprints. If the Palestinians cannot arrest an Israeli, then this cooperation means an advantage for the Israelis only.

[Al-Shawwa] The Palestinian police may not arrest the Israeli settlers living inside the autonomous borders. Cooperation between members of the Palestinian police and the Israeli police is in the domain of disturbances relating to a Palestinian attack on an Israeli. It is cooperation aimed at encircling the Palestinians.

[Al-Husayni] What symbol of sovereignty did the agreement achieve, then?

[Al-Shawwa] There is no sovereignty. If we had gotten sovereignty, Yasir 'Arafat's title would have been "president." Yasir 'Arafat is not a president. We have an autonomous authority, not a state; we are far from getting a state, but we must keep moving forward in order to establish a Palestinian entity, to expand and restore more and more of the land Israel has taken from us.

It seems that this struggle has been going on for 80 years, perhaps, and it is not over now. Optimism and flashy talk are meaningless. The chief of the PLO is not the head of state of the State of Palestine they proclaimed. In actual fact we have no head of state.

[Al-Husayni] He agrees to stop calling himself president?

[Al-Shawwa] He has no choice. We have no state, and it is said that we will have no embassies or representation in other countries. The offices abroad will represent the PLO.

[Al-Husayni] You have said that the judicial body in Gaza resigned when the intifadah began. Has it now been revived?

[Al-Shawwa] Preparations for it have started. There will be courts. We want police and courts in the fullest sense, to abide by the law in Gaza and go back to judicial authority in Gaza, instead of the tribal law we have experienced for the last seven years.

[Al-Husayni] Is that still going on?

[Al-Shawwa] Yes.

[Al-Husayni] How do you solve your problems?

[Al-Shawwa] We go to the chief of the tribe and ask him for a judgement. We lay out the case, and everyone gives his point of view, and then the tribal chief rules, just as it was hundreds of years ago.

[Al-Husayni] Today (Wednesday) is the fifth anniversary of the arrest of Shaykh Yasin. Do you think there is any hope of his release any time soon? Should he be released?

[Al-Shawwa] He must be released. This man only talks; his body is useless. Perhaps his digestive system works, and his heart beats, but he is unable to move. I do not see what harm there would be in releasing him, especially since the ideas in his head and his heart reach his followers whether or not he is in prison. It doesn't make any difference whether he is in prison or not, his ideas get out. Thus Israel is committing a crime in imprisoning this man—a crime against humanity.

[Al-Husayni] Is it true that there have been meetings between the Israelis and some Hamas people?

[Al-Shawwa] There are always meetings, between everybody. The Israeli command asks to hold meetings—it summons the people with whom it wishes to speak. The Israelis have never been silent—they are always horning in here and there to find out what's going on. They're the rulers.

[Al-Husayni] Do you think the Israelis are trying to reach a special agreement with Hamas?

[Al-Shawwa] No. I do not think Hamas is in a position to reach an agreement with Israel. Plus, there is an ongoing dialogue between Fatah, Hamas, and the Popular Front in the territories, and they agree that they will talk among themselves, not between any one of them and the Israelis. But the Israelis always want to know what is going on.

[Al-Husayni] If Hamas decides to keep up its operations, launching them from Gaza and Jericho, won't this have a bad effect on the autonomous authority?

[Al-Shawwa] The Hamas presence is not limited to Gaza and Jericho. It has a presence in the West Bank and among the Arabs of Israel, so incidents will happen.

[Al-Husayni] But if they are launched from Gaza and Jericho, will the Palestinian leadership suppress them?

[Al-Shawwa] We have to wait and see. I do not know how the Palestinian leadership will act if that kind of thing happens. I do not think that only Hamas will undertake operations; there are other Palestinian groups in the Gaza and Jericho areas that might take action. But what reduces the likelihood of operations is for the autonomy to move on to achieve a higher level of Palestinian rights. This could get Hamas to take part, perhaps. Hamas is in the opposition now, but I hope for an atmosphere of participation.

[Al-Husayni] Do you think that Hamas's operations, and those of other Palestinians, might stop, if the settlements were removed from Gaza, for example?

[Al-Shawwa] The Gaza settlements, as I view it, will be removed. This is a bargaining point, to pressure the West Bank.

The West Bank territories make up the greatest part of the lands occupied in 1967. Gaza makes up 2 percent of the Palestinian territories, and the West Bank is 20 percent. The settlements in Gaza are not major—they are given more importance than they deserve, but ultimately they must be removed. They are unable to stay. The big question is what will happen in the West Bank.

[Al-Husayni] What will happen in the West Bank?

[Al-Shawwa] Israel wants to keep the West Bank. For them it is Judaea and Samaria, it is the first Hebrew state, established 3,000 years ago. They believe in it the way they believe in God. It is their land, they claim. Actually it is our land, because they came and were expelled three times. It is a long story. The Palestinians were present on the coast, 2,000 years before the Jews.

[Al-Husayni] So the Palestinian state that has been established, or the Palestinian entity, will be only in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, whose area under autonomy is said to be 62 square kilometers?

[Al-Shawwa] Is it 62 kilometers now? It was 27 kilometers when the PLO went into the talks; it was not specified whether they were talking about the city or the district of Jericho. The area of the district of Jericho in the time of the Turks was 910 square kilometers. In the days of Jordanian rule, it was 370 square kilometers, and then came the Israelis, and because there was no detail in the Oslo agreement, because it was a general agreement, they imposed the fact that the area would be that of the city.

I want to say that nothing lasts in this world. The people in the territories are quiet, but when they have the opportunity to do something they will not hesitate to do it. Israel must satisfy all the Palestinians. It must do that in its own best interests.

When the Arabs left Andalusia, there was a poem, from which I remember three verses:

In all that's incomplete there is a blemish; A man is not deceived by a happy life. These are things as I saw them, states. He who loved one era will be made miserable in other eras. This abode will remain for no one. And will not last at all.

So the poet said. We stayed 650 years in Spain, and left it.

[Al-Husayni] It seems that Israel does not read Arab poetry.

[Al-Shawwa] Israel does read Arab poetry. They know. The Holy Koran says that Israel will not last and whoever reads the Surah of the Cow, the Surah of al-Isra', and the Surah of al-Ma'arij, is reading about the Jews. The Holy Koran is divine scripture.

[Al-Husayni] From the present until such time as Israel vanishes, will the Palestinian entity consist solely of Gaza and Jericho, without the rest of the West Bank lands?

[Al-Shawwa] I am saying that Israel will vanish if it cannot realize, or guarantee, the aspirations of most of the Palestinians, and end their disputes, and satisfy the Arabs around them—that is, end the situation completely.

If Israel wants to live, it will live as part of the Arab Middle East, not as a foreign body. We are 250 million Arabs.

[Al-Husayni] For Israel to live, and to satisfy Palestinian rights, what must it do?

[Al-Shawwa] All the lands occupied in Gaza and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, which were occupied in 1967, should be restored. Then there must be negotiations with the Palestinians who left in 1948, to reach an understanding with them, and compensate them. We will have regained 22 percent of Palestinian territory, and we will have an independent Palestinian entity, linked, God willing, to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, because that way we have strength as Palestinians, and there is strength for the Arabs.

[Al-Husayni] How many square kilometers large is this 22 percent of the land of Palestine?

[Al-Shawwa] The area of the West Bank is 5,500 square kilometers. The area of Gaza is 360 square kilometers.

[Al-Husayni] As you speak of restoring Jerusalem, Yitzhaq Rabin is protesting the sermon Yasir 'Arafat gave in the Johannesburg mosque, in which he called on Muslims for a jihad to liberate Arab Jerusalem. Rabin said that this call was harmful to Islam.

[Al-Shawwa] Rabin should be better aware, because it is not necessary for 'Arafat to talk about Arab Jerusalem, because Jerusalem is Arab, Islamic, and Christian, and there are a billion Muslims who feel the same way.

I know Pakistanis living here in London, and they feel much more strongly than the Arabs do about Jerusalem.

[Al-Husayni] 'Arafat has also said that he has a secret letter from the Israelis, saying that Arab Jerusalem will be returned through negotiations. Rabin has denied it.

[Al-Shawwa] Well, the letter is not secret any more. If he has it, let him publish it.

[Al-Husayni] Does the agreement explicitly contain a method for Palestinians to travel to East Jerusalem?

[Al-Shawwa] In detail, no. But they said that they would specify one or more roads for movement between the autonomous areas themselves, Gaza and Jericho, and and between the authority and Jordan. That means they will not use the road that reaches the center of Jerusalem, for example. But so far they have not specified that route. The road today still goes through Jerusalem.

[Al-Husayni] So there will be no road from the lands under Palestinian authority to reach Jerusalem for prayers?

[Al-Shawwa] That is the question. Israel is the one that gives people permits to pass through. Israel wants the autonomous areas to be linked by roads that bypass Jerusalem, but how will people pray, and how will they get to Jerusalem, where they prayed before the agreement came into effect? Now they can no longer get there, and that is a problem.

[Al-Husayni] Do you think the Israelis will allow 'Arafat to lead prayers in Jerusalem?

[Al-Shawwa] What harm would there be if they did?

[Al-Husayni] Will there be elections in July, or in October, as is said?

[Al-Shawwa] We must be realistic about the elections. We must not wait for a people that were ruled by the Turks for 450 years, and by the British and the Israelis, to know the true meaning of democracy and exercise it. Democracy is a process that evolves. Europe waited 500 years for the arrival of democracy. Give us 10 years.

Elections cannot now reflect the true interests of the people, whether they take place in three months or in October. Order must be established first, the people must have psychological reassurance and feel safe, in order for candidates—and voters—to be free. We need to establish order and enter the stage of making citizens aware of their rights and duties.

During the intifadah, there were many negative things, and it will take years to change them.

[Al-Husayni] Have you now consented to the process of the execution of collaborators?

[Al-Shawwa] Isolated events occur, but they are not an intentional policy.

[Al-Husayni] It is said that you in the territories were sending requests to 'Arafat, up until the last minute, for him not sign the agreement in Cairo. He decided to sign it, ignoring the articles of the agreement that limit the powers of the Palestinian authority and place them under Israeli control. Is this what has happened?

[Al-Shawwa] A protest was sent from a certain group in Gaza, asking 'Arafat not to sign. As to Israeli control, we certainly are under Israeli control. But what is the alternative now? Before the agreement we were 100 percent under Israeli control, now we're perhaps 80 percent under Israeli control. Perhaps we can go even farther. The agreement has happened, and we must march forward. I was warning against this agreement for two years before it happened. I knew it would be a Gaza-Jericho first agreement, and I opposed it from the beginning.

[Al-Husayni] If you knew, and you were against it, why did you agree to be appointed mayor of Gaza?

[Al-Shawwa] I view this position as a duty. I agreed with the citizens of Gaza and with the various Palestinian factions, on the basis that the existence of the Gaza mayoralty is a national necessity, in order for the people of Gaza to go on. For that reason we formed a municipal council expressing national consensus.

[Al-Husayni] If you agreed to be mayor, why were you criticized by the opposition in the beginning?

[Al-Shawwa] The reason for the opposition was to obtain a better situation in the mayor's office as connections for each side.

During the increase in the opposition's votes, I was speaking with the various dissident sides, but we reached an understanding.

In any case, the mayor's office will be a very powerful authority. It was formed and will continue on as was agreed upon in the national meeting. It is a powerful authority representing all the Palestinian sides in the city. And Gaza is the biggest city in Palestine.

[Al-Husayni] Do you agree with what some people say, that this agreement is aimed at reorganizing the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian entity, to turn it into a virtual Israeli protectorate?

[Al-Shawwa] I would tend more to say that we have accomplished nothing worth mention; what we have gotten is something resembling the Balfour Declaration, but we must build on it. The most important thing is for us to remain on the land. Then, between us and the Israelis, there will be ample time to settle things.

Hamas Shaykh Yasin Interviewed

94AA0078A Kuwait *AL-MUJTAMA'* in Arabic
17 May 94 pp 32-33

[Interview with Hamas Shaykh Yasin by 'Umar al-Bursh, in Gaza; date not given: "I Prefer Death In Prison to Conditional Freedom"—first paragraph is *AL-MUJTAMA'* introduction]

[Text] Shaykh Ahmad Yasin is one of the living examples of what Islam is doing to clergymen who cherish it in the present age. Here he needs no introduction, for he is a unique case in everything, even in his prison. On 26 April this interview with him was conducted in Kfar Yona Prison in occupied Palestine; attorney 'Umar al-Bursh, the representative of Dar al-Haq wa al-Qanun [al-Haq] was able to conduct this dialogue:

[Al-Bursh] Will you agree to be released from prison as part of a deal with Israel?

[Yasin] I do not want to be released on any condition or with any restriction, even if I die in prison. I reject any condition for my release.

[Al-Bursh] Growing numbers of Palestinians have abandoned the illusory peace process, and some of them support Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement]. How do you explain this? What is the level of Hamas' support among ordinary Palestinians?

[Yasin] In the beginning, the agreement gave people great hopes and dreams, but they have been disappointed by the talks they have seen. This has turned people towards Islamic convictions, and an Islamic solution. This is the reason that support for the "Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas" is growing.

[Al-Bursh] Will Hamas take part in elections, for either the autonomy council or in municipal elections? If not, in what practical way can you oppose 'Arafat and the management of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will run things in Gaza and Jericho?

[Yasin] In autonomy, we will not take part in the autonomous institutions in any way whatsoever, though I have just one exception: if there were to be legislative elections, rather than executive elections, because I will implement nothing for the Jews. My view is that we should take part in elections if they are for a legislative assembly. When it comes to municipalities and trade unions, we are part of the people, and we will take part, because these things serve the people directly.

As to opposition, we oppose in a non-confrontational manner. We only use the media, press statements, and explaining the truth to the Palestinian people so that the majority will support an Islamic solution.

[Al-Bursh] What will Hamas' position be in the time to come, should the new Palestinian administration use force to break Hamas' strength, or take over its academic institutions, such as the university, or social, military, or political institutions? Will you take no action?

[Yasin] We hope nothing like that will happen. If it does, we will resist it with all our energies and all our ability.

[Al-Bursh] What is your view of Fatah members' attacks on Hamas activists—killing some and kidnapping others, such as Khalid al-Hindi?

[Yasin] These attacks are totally unacceptable to our united Palestinian people. Problems should have been solved through dialogue and the appropriate civilized ways, in each instance.

[Al-Bursh] Will Hamas keep up its military operations against Israeli targets after the implementation of the Oslo agreement—this month?

[Yasin] That depends upon the extent of the Israeli withdrawal.

[Al-Bursh] Hamas has recently been engaged in holding charitable and political festivities to raise funds. How much money has been raised?

[Yasin] I am not out there.

[Al-Bursh] What is your comment on the peace initiative announced by the chief of Hamas' politburo, Dr. Musa Abu-Marzuq?

[Yasin] We want Israel, first of all, to establish the rights of the Palestinian people in their whole homeland: the return of Palestinians abroad to the land from which they were expelled; for the Israelis to withdraw from all the occupied lands, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, unconditionally and without exceptions, with the elimination of all traces of the occupation.

[Al-Bursh] Do you still believe in a purge of all agents? What will Hamas' position on them be in the next stage of developments? Will Hamas continue interrogating and punishing the guilty among them?

[Yasin] If the national authority, which "enjoins good deeds and discourages vice" [Koranic quote] tries the criminals and stops them from harming Palestinian society, then Hamas will not intervene in these or any other matters.

Also, Abie Nathan met with Shaykh Ahmad Yasin in prison, and they had the following exchange, as described by Shaykh Ahmad Yasin.

Shaykh Yasin: Abie Nathan contacted me several times, and said that he made contacts in an effort to free me. He asked me for two things:

1. He asked me to meet 'Arafat in Tunis, and said that he would schedule the meeting in a month or a week. I told him, "I cannot give you an answer to that, because that requires dialogue and discussion with the movement [Hamas] abroad. When the time is right I will meet with him; but I, not you, will choose the appropriate time."

2. He said that "the Israeli right wing is attacking me because I am working to free someone like you. They consider me a criminal. I ask you, when you are released, not to stand up in mosques and say 'Kill the Jews.'"

I told him, "I have never said anything like that before."

He said, "It would be best for you to go free and go abroad, because people are protesting about you."

I answered him, "I will not go out under any condition. I prefer to stay in prison for 20 years than to go free on conditions."

Abie Nathan said, "In any case, I will send you a medical committee to write a report on the state of your health, to justify your release to the Jewish people."

I told him, "Do what you like."

ALGERIA

Moroccans Arrested for Supplying FIS Weapons

94JF0223B Alger: EL WATAN in French 26 May 94 p. 1

[Article by Salem Ghazi: "Moroccan Arms Trafficking Network Still Active"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction.]

[Text] Moroccan police have just seized a significant quantity of firearms destined for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from a Moroccan-Algerian trafficking ring charged with bringing arms into Algeria from Moroccan territory. AFP disclosed yesterday, citing judicial sources.

The six Moroccans and two Algerians charged in the case were arrested on 17 May.

The arms cache discovered at the home of Ighirri Hassane, a 34-year-old Moroccan who is the presumed leader of the group, consisted of 13 submachineguns, a pen-gun ["pistolet stylo"], 350 cartridges (including 50 of 20-mm bore), 12 infrared sighting pieces, military clothing, falsified Moroccan passports, some "hi-fi" equipment, and foreign currency. AFP added.

The story is odd. Is dust being thrown in our eyes? Did the police arrest a small network that was competing against the official ones?

Perhaps the Moroccan authorities, who have turned their country into the world's number-one exporter of hashish, leaped at the chance to try to don the mantle of "purity," where terrorism is concerned.

In reality, it is an open secret that Morocco has become a staging base for the terrorist groups.

In private, leaders in Rabat are fairly open about their support for these groups, evidently for the purpose of putting pressure on Algeria among other things to abandon its support for the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro].

Many well-publicized cases have already exposed Moroccan complicity with those who are assassinating intellectuals, security personnel, and ordinary citizens.

We know for example that Rabah Kebir, after his flight from Algeria, passed through Morocco, where he was afforded every amenity, as was the family of Abassi Madani.

Layada, head of the GIA [armed Islamic group], took refuge in that "fraternal country" when pursued by Algerian security. The Moroccans turned him over to the Algerians when they concluded he had been overrated and over time became an embarrassing guest. They tried, of course, to get something in return for him, but without success.

Also, evidence exists that Algerians who served as mercenaries in Afghanistan have transited Morocco en route back to their homeland. The Casablanca airport has become a hub for these "Afghans."

There are even training camps for Algerian terrorists in the border areas. Not to mention the arms, mainly Israeli-made Uzis, and munitions that regularly pass over an Algero-Moroccan border that is extremely difficult to control.

It is clear that the Moroccan regime wants to destabilize Algeria.

Ighirri Trial: Background on Arms Network

94JF0223B Alger: EL WATAN in French 5 Jun 94 pp. 1-5

[Article by M. Abderrahmane: "Mystery of Moroccan Arms Trafficking Network"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction.]

[Text] Tomorrow, before the military tribunal of Rabat, begins the trial in the case of the Moroccan trafficking ring organized to funnel arms to the ex-FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] guerrillas. The six Moroccans and two Algerians have been remanded to the military court in the capital of the Cherifian kingdom.

The affair has not yet given up all its secrets, but the trial begins tomorrow—a fact that adds to the mystery. On 17 May, Moroccan security announced the arrest of six Moroccan citizens and two Algerians involved in an arms trafficking network organized to assist the guerrillas of the ex-FIS.

The alleged ringleader answered to the name of Hassane Ighirri. A very active member of the Islamist international, Ighirri was known for his suspicious travels.

He used his numerous trips to the Middle East to build solid ties of amity and converted to Shiism.

The advent of Khomeyni paved the way for his efforts to export the Islamic revolution.

In Qum, he received the same military training as Mohamed Gousmi, although it is not known whether the two men were acquainted. In Syria, he assiduously cultivated figures in the Saudi Shiite opposition, but chose the West over the Levant, without for all that abandoning his obsession: to establish an Islamic republic extending from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic.

To do this, in 1988 he created a subversive organization—"Rabitat Er-Rissala El Islamiya" or "League of the Islamic Message"—that operated under the protection of the Iranian Embassy in Spain.

He was also a founding member of the Moroccan opposition democratic movement. He was made a member of the central committee after the movement's constitutive congress, held in Malaga in April of last year.

The genesis of the arms trafficking case is known to all, but a capsule summary may prove useful.

On 17 May, eight persons were arrested by Moroccan police.

The eight—six Moroccans and two Algerians—were implicated, according to the Moroccan case, in the affair of the French-registered aircraft brought in from Germany.

In his confession, the alleged leader of the network avowed that the transported arms were destined for guerrillas in the ex-FIS in Algeria, and that they had been acquired by Algerians in Germany and transported to Spain, where they were taken by a certain Youssef Labyedh, a Moroccan Islamist militant living in exile in Belgium.

The two Algerians apparently had been involved in the operation from the outset, since one of them, Said Hamaz, is a student in Germany, and his sidekick, Chebial, works there. The whole affair seemed neatly wrapped up, except for two important details.

The first has to do with the motive for the Moroccans in joining a struggle which, in the last analysis, was not their own, even though there will always be fools who believe in the "miracle" of the Islamist international. According to reports from the preliminary hearing (the fastest in history for this type of case), Ighirmi and his compatriots were supposedly motivated by profit.

That fails to make sense, because if Ighirmi was crazy enough to return to his homeland (he had left Morocco after the 1981 disturbances in Casablanca), reappearing only on 26 April, the actual date of his arrest, according to political cronies, at a time when he knew that all the bloodhounds in the kingdom were looking for him, he should have been paid a princely sum for it—enough to justify the risk of traveling to Tazmamart or the sadly famed Derb Moulay Cherif.

Moreover, if the ex-FIS's arms provisioning network is well-enough funded to pay for the services of accomplices, why did its silent partners encumber themselves by hiring opponents of a regime, which until then had grandly turned a blind eye to their activities? The weakness of Moroccan officials for "bakshish" is well-known, along with the indifference of Moroccan authorities to the fact that arms pass along the same route as the hashish production of Ketama. Another inconsistency with the motivation theory advanced by Moroccan investigators is that a pecuniary motivation simply does not jibe with the personality of Hassane Ighirmi.

Troubling Details

The ideological initiation he received from his "case officer" in Qum and his own boundless ambitions have made him someone who could scarcely be criticized for acting from "base material" considerations. Another oddity: If Ighirmi were going to transport weapons, he would do so for his spiritual father, Abdelkrim Moutria, whose Islamic youth movement, Echabiba El Islamiya, created in 1968, is apparently active on university campuses and preparing to take up arms. All this is to say that if Ighirmi transported arms, he did not do it for the ex-FIS but for his own movement in Morocco.

What drove the Moroccan security services to this elaborate investigation? The Algerians, however, are not a wild bunch of fanatics, particularly the Youssef Labyedh mentioned above, and he is not a member of the network in Spain. This is the second troubling detail in the affair.

In a communique dated 31 May from Sahara 180, again forwarded to our editors, officers of the Moroccan army are involved in the affair and dated 27 May 1994. Many sentences are being forwarded in Arabic and in the Ighirmi's own confessions, which are in French, and in the communique. According to Labyedh, this summary was circulated by the royal palace to distract Algerians from thoughts about its own direct support for the armed groups.

Rabat was contriving to make Algerians understand that cessation of such support would depend on the latter's position on the Western Sahara issue. According to Youssef Labyedh, it was a crude maneuver, and this signal to Algerian authorities on the eve of the Sahara referendum is unlikely to be sympathetically received.

The trial, which opens tomorrow, is likely to get hot. Dozens of lawyers are already jostling each other in front of the heavy portals of the military tribunal, at Rabat. It remains to be seen, however, whether it will be open to the press.

[Box p. 5]

Saharan Revelations

"To my knowledge, we maintain no ties to Moroccan, based on their adherence to any Islamist strategic framework," Abdelhak Sahraoui told MAROC-HEBDO. Described as the vice president of the FIS, this founding member of the now-dissolved party urges Morocco to support the activities of ex-FIS militants.

"Moroccans are our brothers. I do not understand this position taken by Morocco as a Muslim country. Now, our combatants have decided to do away with the military regime. The arms we are trying to transport are not destined for Morocco. They are destined for our combatants, who have committed themselves to a guerrilla struggle against despotism," he avows. Sahraoui thus publicly confirms the existence of the Moroccan trafficking network that provides arms to the Islamist groups.

In the same interview, Sahraoui demands an explanation from the Moroccan Government for the "groundless" arrest and detention of ex-FIS militants. "The Moroccan authorities should tell us once and for all whether FIS militants are 'undesirables' in Morocco. To Algerians, to the FIS, Moroccans are their brothers, and we can count on them. Our aim is not to turn Morocco 'topsy-turvy' but to bring down the military junta that has ruled Algeria for the last 30 years," he adds. This former permanent representative (between 1954 and 1962) of the French union Workers Force says he is animated by hope for change and liberation.

He notes, in that regard, and with many encomiums, that one of King Hassan II's titles is "Amir El Mouminine," prince of the faithful. Asked about the Moroccan network, Sahraoui says it is of negligible importance compared to arms captured inside Algeria. "If we had counted on that network to provide all the arms for the guerrillas, the battle would have been lost long ago," he says. For him, the Western Sahara issue is "an artificial problem." "If we had been in the position of the people of Western Sahara, we would have chosen to live with Morocco.... Polisario's leaders want to erect a state on a vast desert," he says. Sahraoui claims he never asked the French Government for refugee status. According to him, such status entails many constraints. "When I came here, I said: 'I am the vice president of the FIS, and if you do not want me I can go somewhere else.' So I was able to keep my freedom of speech and action."

Also, Sahraoui says he has no ability to influence the armed groups. "There are people who are living in the mountains...who can do it, but the groups will never stop."

Hattab Brothers, Activity in Harraga; 'Mossab' Bio

94AF0216B. *Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE in French*
6 Jun 94 p 9

[Article by Rachid Drif: "Harraga the Anonymous"; first paragraph is ALGERIA-ACTUALITE introduction]

[Text] Ben Mered and Benzerga are in a region that was free of violence for a long time but has become the logical extension of the Blida-Khemis El Khechna center of activity.

Harraga has emerged from its anonymity as an isolated hamlet wedged between "Kaouet Chergui" and "Souachette." Five terrorists were killed there last week. Two of them were members of the Hattab family, the group that planned and executed the attack on Kasdi Merbah.

A third member of the family died in February during the attack on a Republican Guard patrol in Ben Mered in the same region. Abdelkader Hattab ("Mouloud"), 47, said to be one of the armed movement's leaders, is still on the run. He has been wanted since 1990 for his participation in the stealing of explosives in Faous near Jijel. He is one of the oldest Islamic terrorists still alive and at large. His group, now decimated, was once in all the headlines. Assameur, the presumed "boss" of Tekfir Oua El-Hidjra ["to declare infidel and withdraw"], died in Pakistan in murky circumstances. Allam ("Emir Nouh") was sentenced to death and executed. Seddiki was arrested by police, escaped from prison, and was then killed during a shoot-out. They were Islamists who went underground as the leaders of the former FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] were preparing to take power.

The home territory of the Hattabs—Ain-Taya, Heraoua, Ben Mered, Bordj El-Bahri, Harraga, and Rouiba—was for a long time free of violence and considered a "fall-back area" for the armed groups. Today that same region has become the logical extension of the Blida-Khemis El

Khechna center of activity, and it is now another hot spot, this time east of Algiers.

Clashes there are less frequent than in Mitidja, but attacks have been increasing without being reported in the media.

In Bordj El-Bahri in 1992, the local representative of the RPN [National Patriotic Rally] was murdered in broad daylight in front of his children. It was a trivial event as far as the press was concerned. Kasdi Merbah was later murdered in the same place. In that case, about 30 witnesses identified part of the group. Accomplices were arrested, but the gang's active members seem to have left the region. The town's post office was held up in broad daylight by two armed men wearing djelbabs. A passer-by foiled the holdup by sounding the alarm. Two months later, unknown persons called him by his first name and fired shots at him. In Harraga, a police patrol was hailed by a man dressed in a djelbab who opened fire, killing three officers and wounding a fourth, while the driver, who was hit in the hand, managed to escape. Dozens of similar attacks within a radius of less than 10 km are generally attributed to the Hattab group and other cells close to the former supporter of Bouyali.

Islamist Networks

During the time of Mustapha Bouyali's underground groups back in the 1980's, Chebouti lived in Bougara near Blida, but following his release in 1990, he settled officially in Benzerga, better known as Harraga. A few hundred meters from that locality is the "diplomatic" town that was the home of another well-known Islamist, Said Makhoulfi, alias "Zakaria," the Bechara man who wrote "the pamphlet on civil disobedience." Abdennacer El-Eulmi, brother of the dean of the Islamic Labor Union (SIT), taught nearby, in Bordj El-Bahri. He held meetings at the homes of friends in the company of M. Meliani, the founder of the GIA [Armed Islamic Group]. Others were H. Kaouane, the "chaabi" singer and close friend of Djamel Lounici suspected of supplying the underground with arms from Germany, and A. Chakendi, alias "Shaykh Ibrahim," the emir of the MIA [Armed Islamic Movement] who was recently sentenced to death by the Algiers Special Court.

It was also in Bordj El-Bahri (formerly Cap Matifou) that hundreds of kilograms of TNT were stored pending their transportation to Algiers by members of the above-mentioned Allam group.

In Heraoua near Ain-Taya, one of the SIT's very first cells was established at a unit of the National Passenger Transport Company (SNTV) by the all-powerful union headed by Omar El-Eulmi, which quickly spread to every town in the country.

All those well-known Islamists were living within the law at the time, and only Hattab Mouloud was underground and being "actively sought," as the standard formula puts it. Bouyali's other former supporters either joined the former FIS, as did Chebouti, who spoke at some of

the meetings held by Abassi's and Benhadj's party, or abandoned all political activity, as did Merrah, another close associate of the preacher from El Achour.

Oddly enough, the Bordj El-Bahri area was free of terrorism for many long months, whereas Mitidja lived in daily fear. Events started to move faster beginning in the second half of 1993, and since that time, sporadic and scattered actions by armed groups have been imposing a climate of insecurity similar to the one in the "triangle of death," although fewer forces are concentrated there. Networks of "sleepers" probably exist: the big shots in Islamic activism have passed through those small towns in Boumerdes, and contacts have probably been reactivated. At the same time, the security services are extremely isolated from the population because of the security situation, with the result that intelligence work is less thorough.

Waltz of the Emirs

In an article on Constantine that it published recently, the daily EL WATAN reported a rumor to the effect that Emir "Mossab," one of the armed movement's presumed leaders whose real name is Khatir Benhamida Boudali, was dead. A famous person completely unheard of by the uninitiated, he has the typical profile of the emir, and his career is "exemplary" (EL WATAN, 30 May 1994; ALGERIE-ACTUALITE, No. 1437, May 1993).

"Mossab" was born near Ain Temouchent in 1965, and that is where he obtained a baccalaureat in mathematics. He wound up at the Emir Abdelkader University of Islamic Sciences in Constantine, a branch of learning completely opposed to that at his lycee. In 1987, he flew off to Syria, where he joined the Muslim Brotherhood movement. He returned to Constantine in 1990. He was 25 years old and, on the basis of his experience, became imam of the El Ansar mosque and a member of the SIT. In December, he was arrested in his hometown of Hassi El Ghella for delivering a virulent sermon. He was placed under a committal order and brought to trial. He was given a two-year suspended sentence and returned to Constantine. He was one of the leaders of the strike in June and then went underground. Two warrants for his arrest were issued—in December 1992 and February 1993—by the military court and the Constantine Special Court for undermining state security and murder. He simply took up arms and assumed the title of emir.

An assessment of the situation today leads to the conclusion that 20,000 Islamists have gone underground like "Mossab," but in varying degrees. Rumor has it that Gousmi, the head of the GIA (26 years old!), is dead, and that so is Schali, who reportedly was killed in Blida and identified by his father but not by his wife. More than 100 emirs have fallen in 18 months, and anyone can take a leader's place and, by grabbing a Kalashnikov, lead an armed group and recruit members from the underworld, the working class districts, or the mosques. That is what happened in the case of the Hattabs. Zouheir, Hacene, and Toufik, all under 30 years of age, followed the

example of their cousin, the former Bouyali follower who is now about 50 years old and has been on the run for four years. His group has been growing steadily.

Abdelhak Layada on Moroccan's Offer of Support

94AF0223C Algiers EL WATAN in French 16 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by N. Anani: "Moroccans Wanted To 'Recruit' Abdelhak Layada"]

[Text] Did Morocco's clandestine services try to recruit Abdelhak Layada? During his hearing yesterday before the Special Court of Algiers, Layada revealed he had been contacted by officers of the Royal Army who tried to induce him to work for them.

On 16 April 1993, a month after his clandestine entry into Moroccan territory, Layada was arrested by security agents. Next he was taken to Rabat where after several days detention he was interrogated by Moroccan officers. Believing him to be an important leader of the armed groups of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), they promised to help him. "They told me that if I agreed to collaborate with them, they would open a FIS bureau in Morocco. They even promised to put money and medical services at our disposal," Layada avowed. According to him, his interlocutors told him that Algeria's support for Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] was very harmful to Morocco.

"Your country is sheltering opponents of our country and offering them all the help they need. There is even a group of them that is very active in your country," they told him. According to Layada's testimony, the cooperation requested by the officers was, in fact, the physical liquidation of certain opponents, including one Abdelaziz el Fassi. "When I refused, they urged me to reflect more carefully on their offers," Layada adds.

Still refusing to cooperate, he was brought to trial and handed a two-year prison sentence.

"They gave me a choice between serving time in Algeria or going to prison in Morocco. I chose my own country," the accused testified. The president of the court interrupted Layada, citing the existence of judicial conventions between the two countries as the basis for his extradition. Layada, who gave 2 August 1993 as the date of his extradition to Algeria, was unfortunately not permitted to elaborate further on the Moroccan offers.

Layada testified he landed on Moroccan soil with no passport. He managed to cross the border in March 1993 on a false identity card, with the help of a contact answering to the name of Abdelkader residing in Maghnia. The card bore the name Mourad Bouchneb. It was not made clear whether this document was Algerian or Moroccan.

Message Behind Organized MPR March

94AF0217B Algiers EL WATAN in French 13 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Sofiane Bensalem: "Republicans Mobilize"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The Movement for the Republic (MPR) decided to organize a national march to promote "Algerian democracy by means of a republican break with the past" on 29 June, the anniversary date of the assassination of former President Mohamed Boudiaf.

The MPR, which was believed to be in eclipse on the national political scene, is holding its first public demonstration of the year on 29 June, which coincides with the second anniversary of the assassination of President Boudiaf. The choice of the date is no accident, since the movement, established on 25 November at the conclusion of the "estates general of republican patriots," upholds the ideals of the deceased leader. The communique calling for the demonstration says that "in six months Mohamed Boudiaf...gave (his country) something that no other leader has given it since 1962: a patriotic and republican national agenda. An agenda reconciling Algeria with its [Berber] ethnicity, its Arab heritage, and its Islamic heritage..."

The call for this national march is intended not only to "honor this option" espoused by the late president but also to "demand the truth about (his) assassination, impose the alternative espoused by the popular, patriotic, and prerepublican forces, open a new era, and transcend both fundamentalism and the regime that produced it."

On that point, the MPR in its appeal chastised the regime, which it terms "spent" and "bereft of ideas," and accused it of "selling out the country's interests" and "mobilizing its most conservative elements in an effort to protect its vested interests."

In a sense, it could be said that the MPR, while not spelling out its political platform in detail, has already prefigured it in the call for the 29 June march, describing it as "the first action of a great popular movement of national resurrection to rehabilitate democratic Algeria by means of a break with the past."

It will be recalled that the MPR since its founding has held rallies in several large cities around the country, as well as in Paris for Algerian emigrants living in France.

But early this year it ceased all public activity because, we were told, the political and security situation had changed since last November; for the same reason, the conclaves scheduled for last March were postponed.

Parents React to Islamic 'Extremist' Tract

94AF0216D Algiers HEBDO LIBERE in French 25-31 May 94 p 3

[Article by L.R.: "Letter From Horrified Parents"]

[Text] We received a letter from a reader, the parent of a schoolchild, and with it was the document we are printing below [not reproduced]. The document in question is obvious proof that the Islamic extremists have infiltrated, not to say taken over, the schools.

That small publication proves that fundamentalist ideology is far from losing momentum and that it is more alive and more insidious than ever. Adopting a falsely educational tone, it tries to indoctrinate young children by instilling in them daily behavior and concepts that were thought to be outmoded. By asserting that the attitudes recommended by the manual in question are a legitimate part of our religion, the authors and masters of that psychological action have taken one more step in their efforts to take us back to the medieval era. The most serious thing about their action is that it finds support and complicity in teaching circles and, necessarily, among school principals, who clearly cannot be unaware of the scheming and agitation going on in their schools, especially when political subversion is involved.

How many parents must have been horrified to see such a manual in the hands of their children but did not know who to complain or report the matter to because fear and suspicion are constantly present in our actions and thoughts?

We knew that our schools had been taken hostage, ruined, and violated, and that they had long been besieged by the supporters of reactionary ideologies. Now we are sure that the evil goes deeper than was thought or said! Manuals other than those approved by national education authorities are being distributed to pupils at no cost! Which is just one more way of saying and proving that the republic's schools are being replaced by schools of another kind!

The psychological impact of that maneuver is beyond measure and will only be realized as time goes on—when today's young children grow up. As for the damage done to the minds of desperate and helpless parents in the face of such an attack on their children, whom they cannot defend, that will be left to the judgment of our political officials, who do not seem to be mobilizing and coming to a decision clearly and resolutely in favor of a new and genuinely free school system.

EGYPT

American Strategic Policy in Middle East Reviewed

Strategic Priorities Considered

94LD0061A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 1 May 94 p 5

[Part four of series by Taha al-Majdub: "Spotlight on Strategic Transformations in U.S. Foreign Policy: Priority for the Middle East in U.S. Policy"]

[Text] If our talk today is about the strategic transformations in the U.S. Middle East foreign and military policy,

then the place to start is the economic issue, because it is the pivotal issue in U.S. foreign policy. Thus, this policy deals with fundamental issues, such as security, foreign aid, settlement of regional conflicts, plus democracy and human rights as issues that are subject to economic calculations.

Despite this, we can see that during the Clinton administration there has been an absence of a balanced and clearcut U.S. strategy that ties interest in democracy with security and economic interests and that takes into account the balance of forces to make these balances into a real mainstay of stability and peace, and not just a means to preserve the U.S. self interests, without concern for real peace for the region's peoples.

Initial Features

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said, "U.S. capabilities must be measured by what they offer to serve vital U.S. interests. The United States must preserve these capabilities to be used in cases that pose a threat to the heart of U.S. national interests." Perhaps this statement explains to us the contradiction and ambiguity we sense in U.S. policy. U.S. actions have become more closely connected with U.S. interests and more proportionate to the limits of these interests and the responsibilities they entail.

If we compare the interest levels, we will find that the ongoing dangerous war in Bosnia, which threatens to become even uglier and more dangerous, has been considered a humanitarian issue. Despite the current troubles in Russia and their serious indications, it is certain that the Middle East continues to enjoy high priority in U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton administration. Moreover, the conditions in the Middle East and Gulf region require a different U.S. political conduct that is not characterized by vacillation and indecision and that is compatible with the importance of U.S. strategic interests in this region.

This situation is clearly reflected in U.S. policy on the Middle East peace process that seeks to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and to establish security and stability in the Middle East region. This situation will have a direct impact on U.S. vital interests in the region. Even though the U.S. position on the peace issue is positive, we can see that this positivism still needs to be bolstered for the United States to gain the role of a "full" and real "partner" in the peace process. The deficiency afflicting the U.S. role is, from the Arab perspective, due fundamentally to the impact of the special U.S.-Israeli relationship and to the unbalanced criteria that this relationship imposes on the U.S. policy vis-a-vis the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States considers its relationship with Israel a fundamental strategic relationship. Consequently, this relationship has its direct impact on U.S. conduct toward Middle East issues generally and toward the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. In all cases, or at least most cases, this impact favors Israel.

Even though other international issues receive their adequate share of U.S. interest, we can see that the U.S. administration's record has abounded in the past 15 months with major efforts connected with the Middle East region. Perhaps the most important of these efforts are:

- The first trip U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made after the Clinton administration took office was a trip to the Middle East, where Christopher visited Israel and five Arab countries, namely Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon.
- The great accomplishment made last September when Israel and the Palestinians concluded the Declaration of Principles for the first time in the history of the conflict.
- The first U.S.-Syrian summit took place in Geneva last December. It is expected that this summit will have a strong impact on advancing the peace process, especially along the Syrian-Israeli track.

These activities reflect some initial features of the new U.S. Middle East policy. The most prominent of these features can be defined in the following:

- Giving the Middle East main priority in U.S. foreign policy, with emphasis on the presence of evident and continued interest in the Middle East.
- Reaffirming the U.S. administration's commitment to the peace process; moving the process forward; accelerating its pace; and viewing it as an urgently important issue out of clear awareness that inactivity in the peace process will harm U.S. national interests in the region.
- Reaffirming the Gulf region's security through policies that seek to reassure the Arab Gulf states, along with continued filling of the security gap existing in the region so as to achieve the necessary strategic military balance.
- Developing and expanding U.S. economic interests in the region through a new system for the middle East market.

U.S. Vision of the Middle East Region

The U.S.'s main interests in the Middle East region cover two areas: 1) ensuring the continued flow of oil from its production centers in the region to consumption centers in Europe and the United States; 2) ensuring Israel's security and accomplishing its integration into the region. Subsequent to these [areas] comes the drafting of a clear strategy to achieve regional security and stability in a manner that safeguards vital U.S. interests.

Even though these interests have represented a permanent feature in U.S. strategy throughout the past four decades, they have assumed major importance under the Clinton administration, when compared with U.S. interests in other parts of the world within the framework of the international and regional developments since the end of the Cold War.

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher confirms that the Middle East region is of special importance to

the United States and that it is becoming more important in light of the economic rivalry between the United States on the one hand and Japan and Europe on the other.

The dimensions and features of the U.S. Middle East strategy can be visualized on the basis of these interests. To secure oil flow and stable oil prices the United States needs a strategic vision that can handle extremely significant security issues, provide balance in the Middle East region, and deal with the perils of Iran's role in the region, with Iraq's future, and with the impact of the continued presence of the current Iraqi regime.

The post-Cold War conditions and the regional developments that have reached a sharp turning point since the Gulf crisis have imposed new facts on U.S. strategic and political thinking and have led to a fundamental change in the peace concept that has prevailed among Americans. This concept has developed from one of ending the war to a concept of establishing a new order in the Middle East to "end the individual role played by the Arab countries and to launch an era in which Israel and Turkey, and perhaps Iran at a later stage, play an important role in the Middle East—a role in which the region's economy changes with the introduction of a free market economic system and in which the political regimes become more democratic. [final quotation mark omitted as published]

These changes represent the "U.S. vision" of the Middle East's future and embody the main interests of U.S. policy and the basis on which the United States will define the nature of its relations and the extent of its cooperation with the region's various countries. Consequently, we should not expect any change in the nature of the current U.S. Middle East role, which is basically tied to the Israeli vision as long as the the aforementioned developments have not taken place.

Despite this, the definition of the final shape of the future U.S. vision of the Middle East continues to face fundamental difficulties with some complex issues, most significantly the issue of religious radicalism in numerous Middle East countries. This issue evokes the concerns of and represents a real challenge to the U.S. Middle East policy.

Finally, from the above we can make some conclusions about the new Middle East map, as seen from the U.S. perspective:

- Emphasizing the "core" area of the Middle East, which includes the Arab states located in the vital area extending from the Gulf in the east to the eastern basin of the Mediterranean.
- Isolating Iraq, until its political regime changes, and isolating Iran, until its policy and behavior are once again disciplined and apart from the corps group in the Middle East region.
- Creating a strategic relationship between the core Arab group and both Israel and Turkey within the framework of a Middle Eastern order.

- Developing strategic economic and security relations in the region to protect and develop U.S. interests in this region.

Thus, the new Middle Eastern group will include Israel and Turkey along side the core regional nations of the Middle East, which include the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states and the Arab countries adjacent to Israel, provided that Turkey and Israel are incorporated into the region on a geographic and economic basis. The Middle East link is completed with the close relationship existing between these two countries and the United States—a link that is subject to the sole leadership of the United States.

Regional Security Goals Analyzed

94LD0061B Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 9 May 94 p 5

[Part five of a series by Taha al-Majdub: "Spotlight on Strategic Transformations in U.S. Foreign Policy; U.S. Vision and Middle East Security"]

[Text] The U.S. vision of the Middle East security emanates from vital U.S. interests in the region, which cover two main areas: first, ensuring the flow of oil from its production centers in the region to consumption centers in Europe and the United States and, second, reaffirming Israel's security and ensuring its survival and its incorporation into the region. To protect these interests the United States needs to have a "strategic vision" that can address significant security issues, provide for establishing several essential balances in the Middle East region, deal with the threat of Iran's role in the region and with the future of the current Iraqi regime.

In the previous article of this series, we concluded how some main features of the new Middle East map look from the U.S. perspective. This perspective focuses on the "core" sector of the Middle East that includes the Arab states extending from the Gulf in the east to the eastern Mediterranean Basin in the west—along with the creation of a strategic relationship between the Arab core and both Israel and Turkey within the framework of a Middle Eastern regional order and with the development of strategic economic and security relations in the region to protect and develop U.S. interests.

Mainstays of Vision

This change in U.S. policy toward the Middle East is due to several major factors, perhaps the most significant of which are the end of the Cold War, the reduced intensity of the danger that the Arab-Israeli conflict represents for world peace and U.S. interests, and the transformation of this conflict into a regional issue. The change is also due to the declining possibilities of the eruption of a new energy crisis similar to the crisis that occurred in the 1970s now that oil prices have dropped and that the possibility of reduced oil production has disappeared. As for Israel's security, which represents a main focus of U.S. Middle East strategy, Israel has gained the upper hand and the Arabs have to work hard to get concessions from Israel on

the issues of territories and Jerusalem. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration refuses to apply any pressure on Israel, a fact that highlights an evident contradiction in the peace process. The United States, which is a full partner in the peace process, does not intervene if negotiations are obstructed, especially if they are obstructed for Israeli reasons. Rather, the United States is prepared to ally itself with the policies adopted by Israel on the self-rule issue. But the situation is different where the Syrian-Israeli track is concerned. Here, the U.S. administration is very willing to play its traditional middleman's role between the two parties. In its endeavor to play this role, the U.S. administration takes into account the Egyptian-Israeli peace experience and the presence of numerous models that can be applied to the Golan front, not to mention that each of the two parties has a great wish to see the United States play this role.

The U.S. interest in settling the problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in achieving a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Arab countries through bilateral negotiations represents one of the major U.S. efforts to create the new Middle East geopolitical map. Another endeavor is embodied in the U.S. reaffirmation of its eagerness to see the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] member states participate in the regional effort by joining the multilateral negotiations and by inviting some of the committees involved in these negotiations to hold meetings in GCC countries. To make the future picture of the Middle East region complete, the United States has supported the discussion of development issues and other issues of regional importance, such as water, curtailed armament, and environmental issues. The United States has also supported Israel's and Turkey's presence in these multilateral negotiations so they can participate in discussions of the issues. In this manner, the new Middle Eastern core can include Israel and Turkey, provided that they are incorporated into the region on the basis of the geoeconomic factor, not to mention on the basis of the two countries' firm relations with the United States. That then completes the Middle Eastern link under the sole leadership of the United States.

Turkey is a NATO member, and it is the Islamic model that is closest to the West with its political system and its civil laws. It is a major regional power that can confront Iranian ambitions, whether in Central Asia or the Middle East. With its water wealth, Turkey can protect its influence over the region's countries that need its water. At the same time, it is a link between the Middle East and the Far East on the one hand and the West on the other. Turkey's participation is not expected to be confined to economic development but may extend to joint security and military plans with the United States.

As for Israel, it is the permanent strategic ally of the United States, which is committed to ensuring Israel's security and assuring its qualitative superiority over the Arab countries—even though the Jewish state's strategic value has decreased relatively since the end of the Cold War with the absence of a bilateral conflict in the Middle East and because of the presence of U.S. protection of oil

sources. However, Israel continues to be of great strategic importance to the United States. It is the West's ally against "Islamic radicalism." Israel exaggerates the danger of this radicalism to convince the United States that it has a new strategic enemy. Israel is stable politically and advanced technologically, and it can contribute to developing the weapons arsenal that the United States plans to store in Israel itself. To prepare for the incorporation of Israel into the region, the United States has begun to demand that the Arab states lift the economic boycott and that they guarantee complete normalization so Israel can ensure its qualitatively superior defense security and its more open economic security.

Instruments of Vision

U.S. interests are influenced by the potential sources of threats in the Middle East, and these include some intrinsic sources and some domestic sources. If we review the intrinsic factors exerting a negative influence, we find that they lie in the fact that the U.S. strategy is influenced by pressure elements within the U.S. society. Consequently, this strategy is subjugated to the strategic and moral bond with Israel, and it is obviously inclined to espouse Israeli policies, even though they are unfair to Arab rights. This tendency represents a fundamental weakness in U.S. strategy—a weakness that exposes it to shakiness and imbalance. This is why the strategy that the United States uses to deal with the region's political developments and that it uses to evaluate the region's states seems to be unclear and unbalanced. At times, this strategy pushes U.S. foreign policy toward confusion and duplicity, thus exposing it to loss of credibility in the eyes of many of its friends in the region.

The most important of the external regional factors is the possibility that the Middle East peace talks may falter and fail. Such a failure would change the pattern of alliances within the region, especially since signs of revived Russian activity in the region have emerged. The second possibility is linked to the Iranian threats and the attempts to export the Iranian model to the Middle East and to the Islamic republics of Central Asia, and to the likely rise of Islamic blocs hostile to U.S. policy. Moreover, the intensifying waves of terrorism and the spread of radicalism in the region could create a climate of instability harmful to U.S. interests that could lead to changing some moderate regimes and to the domination of some countries' policies by tendencies that are hostile to U.S. presence in the region.

Here, we can say that the U.S. assessment of the threats facing the U.S. Middle East strategy may itself be tantamount to an effort to create new opportunities to bolster U.S. influence in the region. The more numerous the elements of instability become and the more strongly U.S. strategic interests are threatened, the greater become the possibilities of direct U.S. intervention—even the use of military force. Proceeding on this basis, U.S. strategy is concerned with developing sophisticated modern armed forces that are capable of defending its interests, taking into account the new threats facing these

interests and the possible sources of such threats. This requires securing a strategic infrastructure in the region to meet the needs of transporting and supplying these forces through significant bases and facilities in the region, especially in the Gulf and in Israel.

Since the main objective of U.S. strategic transformations is to lower economic burdens and to curtail foreign expenditures, the idea of a "foreign partnership" has become a vital part of this strategy [which is designed] within an economic context of greater relevancy to U.S. national security. If near-term conflicts continue to be regional and if they do not expand into comprehensive international conflicts, there will be greater reliance on regional forces, through the assignment of greater roles to either the region's prominent countries or to its regional blocs.

Within this principled framework, the new Middle East regional order will rely on the oil countries to shoulder the main burdens of the U.S. show of force and presence in the region. Likewise, once the problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict are resolved, aid for the Middle East countries will fall to the oil states, while Israel acts as a major regional power protecting U.S. interests from the threat of any regional powers trying to undermine these interests.

In a related development, the U.S. strategy will try to use the region's balances of power to entrench its influence and to maintain its presence in the region by controlling and regulating these balances and by creating among them mutual relations in a manner that ultimately serves the U.S. interests and accomplishes Israel's security within the framework of a new Middle East regional order that is controlled by the United States. To achieve this end, the various regional balances must be subject to the control of the United States, which will have to watch for any dramatic developments in these balances so as to:

- Continue to ensure the Arab-Israeli balance in favor of Israel, without affecting the profound strategic alliance between Washington and Tel Aviv.
- Make the "inter-Arab balance" preserve a continued Arab-Israeli balance, as seen by the United States, and calculate the influence of U.S. friends in the region accordingly.
- Protect the "Arab-Arab balance" along with the Arab-Israeli balance in conformity with the American perspective and adjust the influence of the friends of the United States in the region along these lines.
- Create a mutual threat to the "Arab-Iranian balance" without allowing the threat to lead to the rise of one power to become a threat at the expense of another regional power.
- Ensure that the "U.S.-Russian balance" that has existed since the end of the Cold War continues to favor the United States. It is expected that this balance will be influenced by the possibility of the future revival of the Russian role in the region, considering that Russia is the heir to the Soviet interests and aspirations.

These balances will be controlled by creating an effective institutional system to control the armament of the region's countries. Meanwhile, Israel will continue to be considered not just a strategic ally that cooperates in developing the most sophisticated types of weapons but also a strategic partner of the United States in the Middle East. This unique relationship will be the subject of our next article.

ISRAEL

Fatah Election Platform, Strength Discussed

94P50165A Tel Aviv HATZOFI in Hebrew 30 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Dr. Mark Heller of Tel Aviv University's Center for Strategic Studies by Shulamit Mustick; place and date not given]

[Text] Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine and settlements are a burning problem and an obstacle—these are the main published parts of the Fatah platform for elections to the independent governing authority—and with a partner like this, Israel is renewing talks to expand the autonomy, as much as is possible.

Are the elections for the independent governing bodies close? We asked Middle East expert Dr. Mark Heller of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Tel Aviv.

[Heller] In the meantime, there is no consensus on the issue and, according to the agreement, the subject must be discussed between us and them.

[Mustick] Why, when in fact Fatah is hurriedly publishing its platform?

[Heller] I assume we are talking about opening positions and this is a struggle for the sympathy and understanding of the Palestinian public. The PLO wants to present itself as the one who is not selling out the Palestinian interest.

[Mustick] Can Israel this time ignore the written document?

[Heller] It must not be ignored, but, on the other hand, it should be taken into account that the total platform is a reflection of tendencies and basic questions known for some time. This platform, of course, is not particularly new. In addition, it should also be taken into account that the election platform does not necessarily reflect their final position in the negotiations.

[Mustick] Does this platform ensure the PLO's senior role in the "territories?"

[Heller] I do not think that their senior position is determined from election platforms alone, but mainly from the role the PLO plays in the current stage and its ability to supply the pressing needs of the Palestinians in the regions it already controls. The PLO will not be able to compete with Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] on the flamboyant level, but it can in fact defeat Hamas where it can present the Palestinians with gains that

Hamas cannot. The PLO must gamble that the Palestinian public will be more sober and realistic.

Survey of Possible Solutions to Jerusalem Issue

94A10079D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
3 Jun 94 pp 6-38, 40

[Article by Mikhal Peleg: "Belfast or Brussels: Jerusalem Awaits the Verdict"; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction]

[Text] For 27 years Israel has neglected East Jerusalem, thereby, in fact, paving the way for the establishment of the capital of Palestine. The Palestinians are working quietly and quickly, with financing from foreign governments, and will soon put out practical proposals that will cause consternation in Israel. Israeli researchers are coming to the conclusion that the consensus with regard to Jerusalem is illusory: Who cares about Wadi Joz?

In June 1967 David Ben-Gurion was interviewed by the Japanese newspaper ASAHI SHINBUN and talked about the future of the territories captured by Israel during the Six-Day War, just a few days before. He told the reporter that Israel would withdraw from the Sinai peninsula after a peace agreement was signed with Egypt; "the same thing" he said would happen with Syria; on the West Bank an autonomous state would be established under UN protection; but, despite all the UN resolutions, we would hold Jerusalem forever; "Jerusalem was the capital of Israel for 3,000 years and it will remain so in the future."

A few days later, at a meeting of the Rafi Central on 20 June, the Old Man called for tearing down the wall of the Old City. He listed three reasons:

"A) We want Jerusalem to be one city, not two—Jewish and Arab.

B) The wall must be destroyed; it is not Jewish. It was built by the Turkish sultan in the 16th century.

C) Destroying the wall would have worldwide political significance. Then the world would know that Jerusalem is one, within wounds of the conquest, does not really exist.

In fact, the capital is a patchwork of Jewish neighborhoods, among which are squeezed enclaves of alienated Arab settlements that preserve their existence under difficult conditions. The boundary that once which an Arab minority is possible."

Israel did not destroy the wall, but in the next 27 years she did everything she could to make Jerusalem one city—a Jewish city. But the complete and united Jerusalem, the only national consensus that survived the separated the two parts of Jerusalem disintegrated into dozens of border lines that are elusive yet very real, which people do not cross. The alienation of the two populations created a situation that the Israeli Government certainly did not intend; the efforts invested in

development and construction were aimed at the Jews of Jerusalem, but the disillusionment of the Arab residents left them a separate entity: It is easy now for the Palestinians to demand separation because it already exists in practice.

Before the Six-Day War, the sovereign territory of West Jerusalem comprised 38,000 dunams. In June 1967 Interior Minister Moshe Hayim Shapira published an "annexation order" that added another 72,000 dunams to the city, almost twice her territory—on the basis of three "Adjacency Laws" that were passed by the Knesset and imposed Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration on the annexed territories. These territories included the city of East Jerusalem as well as the lands of 28 Arab villages, and the map was drawn so as to include the fewest possible concentrations of Arab population and the maximum amount of land; this principle explains the strange spread of the boundary line. Sometimes, for example in Anatah, Bet Hanina, Tafr 'Aqav, or Aram, part of the village was left within the West Bank and the other part annexed to Jerusalem. Only one member of the Knesset opposed the annexation, Me'ir Vilner of Raqah; others—including leading leftists—enthusiastically supported the decision. Uri Avneri said that "the people wanted the unification of the city"; Shmu'el Miquis, a Maq leader, declared that "Jerusalem was the capital of Israel from antiquity."

Outside Israel, nevertheless, there was broad opposition to annexation; 99 countries voted in the UN General Assembly for a resolution voiding the unification of Jerusalem. The UN position has remained the same until today, as has the position of the majority in the Knesset.

The battle for Jerusalem did not end with the military conquest. Since 1967 it has continued through massive investments in accelerated construction and infrastructure for Jewish neighborhoods over the entire annexed territory—even at the cost of irreversible damage to the landscape and unique character of the city. Today 160,000 Jewish residents live in East Jerusalem alone, as compared to about 155,000 Arab residents. A supplementary method in this campaign is the confiscation of Arab lands on a broad scale, 26,200 dunams up until now, as well as restrictions on systematic construction for the Arab population and deliberate neglect of basic services provided to it. In the war for territory, the Arab residents of Jerusalem made do all these years with passive opposition that was mainly expressed in low voter turnout for the mayoralty elections (6 percent after the outbreak of the intifadah in 1989, less than 10 percent in the last elections).

Even the famous stones of the city cannot compare in weight to the catapult of words heaped upon her every year, and these days—when it is clear to everyone that it will be impossible to further postpone the talks about Jerusalem's future—the logomachy is beginning to threaten the entire peace process. Last Jerusalem Unification Day, almost every Knesset member took the trouble to go up to the speaker's podium and make his

contribution to the traditional rhetorical masquerade, the essence of which is that "Jerusalem is the complete and united capital of Israel forever"; nor do they spare any words on the Palestinian side—as 'Arafat's jihad speech in Johannesburg will testify. In this context, the former mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek once said that "exhibitionist declarations only hurt the city." Thus, unlike his opposition on the right, Kollek was very careful with his words and avoided concepts like the "Judaization of East Jerusalem"; but in practice he was the man who settled 160,000 Jews in East Jerusalem.

Even Professor Yeshayahu Libovitz termed the conquest of the Western Wall "the most dramatic moment in the history of the Jewish people." In June 1967 he told woman journalist Sylvie Qeshet—"one thing will remain for us out of all this: the 28th of Iyar 1967, the day we captured Jerusalem. I am not sure that the city will remain in our hands, but the day will remain." But Libovitz was also the first to oppose the wave of religious-national enthusiasm that engulfed the country, and in that same interview he called Rabbi Goren "the shofar-blowing clown" and the massive outpouring of people and the scenes of sobbing by the Wall, "idol worship, embarrassing primitive folklore."

On Shavuot of 1967, 370,000 people made a pilgrimage on foot to the Old City, a few days after the end of the war, to rub up against the stones of the Wall; on 14 June, the first day the territory was opened to civilian traffic, 200,000 people poured into the walls of the city. By June 18th the Arabs, who had settled in the Jewish quarter after the War of Independence, were evacuated, as were all the Arab residents of the Moroccan neighborhood, which was torn down by the Israeli authorities immediately after the conquest to create a large open space in front of the Wall. 'Amos Bin-Vered, a HA'ARETZ correspondent, knew how to spin a tale about posters plastered up by the border police "on every house and every car" on the eve of the holiday of Shavuot clearly warning the residents of the Old City that today is a "closed day" (the [Hebrew] term 'lockout' had not yet come into use), and "and no one was to go out the door of his house in order not to disturb the pilgrimage on the circuit reserved exclusively for the Jews. Ben-Vered told how the Arab children would peek out of the windows, on which were tied pieces of white cloth, and the adults hid in their rooms away from the eyes of the pedestrians but "despite that they did not escape the mocking and scornful gestures directed at them by the crowd."

But those lines were lost in the descriptions of mass excitement and joy that no animosity could interrupt. The municipality distributed to the residents of the Old City 5,000 bottles of milk and 10,000 loaves of bread, a gift from the Berman and Angel bakeries and "the residents expressed their satisfaction." Teddy Kollek, who suddenly became mayor of a city with 100,000 Arab residents, said: "I am sure that within a short time there will be full equality—and the feeling of full equality—among all residents of the city. The love that we all feel for Jerusalem and the desire that we all have to promote

the city will help us achieve this." At the same time he called for settling the Old City with tens of thousands of Jews and for transferring the Hebrew University, Hadassah and Ort to Mt. Scopus. Meron Benvenisti was appointed by the municipality to administer the eastern part of the city. On 20 June there was already a call for the destruction of the Moroccan neighborhood, at whose urging no one knows, and it was said that it was improvised by the army. Whoever issued the anonymous order was likened to General Hausmann, who widened the alleys of Paris in order to make way for Napoleon's military parades, and a Jerusalem architect said that they turned the place "from a rampart into a large courtyard with a wall."

On looking back, one phenomenon is particularly striking: Despite the fact that the war had just concluded, the attitude toward the Arabs of Jerusalem and to Arabs in general was entirely different from what it came to be later, during the years of the conquest. 'Uzi Binyamin, then a HA'ARETZ correspondent in Jerusalem, excitedly described the meeting between the residents of the divided city. Today that description sounds unbelievable: "The passage of the residents of liberated Jerusalem into the new city began yesterday morning, before the official removal of the roadblocks...suddenly in the center of the city Arab residents began to appear, walking in groups and curiously looking around. They were accepted with curiosity and with smiles by the residents of Jerusalem. The thin stream quickly turned into a pouring cascade of elderly men in red tarbooshes, groups of young people in suits, wild-looking boys, entire families with their children, men wrapped in red and white kuffiyas—and quickly flooded the city by the thousands."

Because the Israelis had not yet internalized the approach of discriminating against the Palestinians, some of them raised questions of compensation. 'Amos Ayalon wrote: "If the Jews return to the Old City, to Hebron, to 'Atarot and to Kfar 'Etziyon, if Mr. Dov Yosef accepts back his lands on Mt. Scopus, why should not the Arabs of Qatamon, Biq'a and the German settlement demand similar rights for themselves?" And 'Uzi Benjamin described the reactions of the Palestinians returning to their childhood haunts: "Many of them headed for the neighborhoods of Talbiyah, Qatamon, and Biq'a, where they lived 20 years ago. They were seen passing by the neighborhoods and explaining to their family members, who sat pressed together in their cars, about the neighborhood and pointing to the homes where they lived in the past. Many of them answered my question, that they came to see the place where they were born. For the time being they do not know whether they will demand compensation for their homes, and they are waiting for a government decision on the matter." The reporters saw the meeting between the conquerors and the conquered as proof of the maturity of the Israeli nation and noted the understanding and sympathy with

which the Arab "tourists" were received in Jewish Jerusalem, an attitude that demonstrates "the desire of the residents of Israel to live in peace and friendship with their Arab neighbors."

At 2200 the gates of the Armenian quarter in the Old City are closed; no one enters and no one leaves. The Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city do not have gates, although in some sections the municipality has put up fences, at the request of the residents. But when evening falls, they withdraw even more into themselves. The lights of the crowded housing units and the regularly spaced street lamp stanchions on the highways of Neve Ya'akov and Pisgat Ze'ev, Talpiot East, Gil and Ramot soar above semi-darkened islands: Shu'afat, 'Anatah, al-Sawahirah, al-Ram, Silwan, Bayt Safafah, and other quarters that Israelis never go to and have hardly heard of. The no-man's land that once separated the two parts of the city has become a new, broad highway, Highway No. 1, intended to ease traffic from the Jewish neighborhoods in the north to the center of the city, and, in fact, it very clearly defines the line that separates the Jewish city from the Arab part.

Generally at this hour, 2200, when the pedestrian mall of Nahalat Shiv'a is buzzing with people and the pubs around the Russian courtyard are getting ready for their peak time, the streets in the Arab quarters, both within the walls and outside them, are emptying out, and the commercial center of East Jerusalem, around Saladin St. seems as lively as a refugee camp at curfew hour: shutters drawn, hotels half dark and intifadah graffiti on every wall. The movie houses are closed. Entertainment possibilities are limited to the bar at the American Colony Hotel—where foreign reporters stay—two or three restaurants and some dingy hostels in the Old City along Damascus Gate. This is lower Jerusalem, not to be compared to the eternal united capital exalted by Knesset members and the city's mayors: a city divided by fear, discrimination and total alienation.

The new mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert, does not like all the talk about the separated Jerusalem and what has come to be known as "the geography of fear": He calls it, "Phony nonsense without the least bit of good faith." He has just now returned from a prolonged early morning tour of the Old City, he says, and there he had "friendly encounters." He ignored the fact that average Jewish citizens, without a retinue and a security detachment, avoid encounters of any kind in the Arab city. "It is a temporary situation," the mayor says. Olmert intends to invest in improving the appearance of the Arab city and blames Teddy Kollek for total abandonment of the needs of the Arab population. Olmert says he needs 140 million shekels from the government budget to close the gap.

But the residents of the Arab city say that Olmert wants to act on their behalf, if at all, on his terms, with the people he picks and, at the same time, will continue to confiscate their land and ignore their national desires and their representatives. Olmert, of course, will not hold friendly meetings with the people who initiated the

"National Council for Jerusalem-Palestine" project, headed by Faysal al-Husayni. In Israel the al-Husayni initiative has been termed "a shadow municipality." Maybe a shadow municipality is in fact the appropriate body for managing the affairs of the Arab residents of East Jerusalem—an entity that has gradually turned into a shadow kingdom.

In Jerusalem two cities exist side by side. In one, new neighborhoods are going up at a rate unparalleled in the entire State of Israel, with thousands of housing units and enormous investments in infrastructure: highways, gardens, street lights, shopping centers, and industrial and commercial areas. 60,000 housing units for Jews were built from 1967 just in the territories annexed to the city, and another 10,000 are currently under construction. Opposite is another city, that is even hard to call a city, composed of isolated enclaves of a dusty village hue: one or two-story houses, almost without sidewalks, many roads totally unpaved, few street lights, most of which do not work, only one trash collection bin for several streets, no playgrounds or public gardens. In the stories of East Jerusalem you will find residents from Shu'afat, defined as Area A—with the highest property tax rate—coming home on a dirt road; and a story about a resident from Silwan who asked the municipality to fix the broken street lamps on his street, who was asked in turn to hire a watchman to look after them 24 hours a day to keep the children of the intifadah from breaking them; and a story about trash bins in Bet Hanina, that the residents were asked to purchase themselves—meeting the municipal standard and from the official supplier—so that the municipality would agree to remove the refuse. On intersections that serve only the Arab population, even very noisy ones adjacent to schools like the al-Ram intersection in the north of the city, there are almost no traffic lights. In all the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem there is but one housing project, the Nusaybah Project, and it, too, was erected by private initiative. It is hard to find the street names or house numbers.

Electricity for the Jewish neighborhoods is supplied by the Israeli Electric Company. The Arab neighborhoods are served by the East Jerusalem Electric Company, a Jordanian-owned company, whose plants stand desolate near Shuafat since it was forced to stop producing electricity, and it buys it from the Israeli company. Travel to the western part of the city and to the Jewish neighborhoods in the east is accomplished on "Eged" buses; the Palestinians are served by small private bus companies, most operating from the adjacent villages such as Abu-Dis and al-'Ayzariyah. The drivers of Jewish taxis from West Jerusalem are willing to penetrate east beyond the lines of the status quo only as far as the American Colony Hotel, but most refuse (despite the fact that they are subject to a fine for doing so) to take passengers to other places in the Arab part of the city.

The Green Time

It is possible to argue that the lifestyle and the nature of Arab construction are what dictate the difference in character of the neighborhoods; that is a small part of the truth. Most of the territory annexed in 1967 to Jerusalem—73,000 dunams—was village land unwillingly made part of the city. In 1968, 1970, 1980, and 1990, confiscations of privately owned Arab land were carried out totaling 26,200 dunams. Another approximately 2,300 dunams will be confiscated according to plan in the near future; tens of thousands of housing units for Jews were built on these lands. Thus arose Gilo, Talpiot East, Neve Ya'akov, Pisgat Ze'ev and the like. Another 35,000 dunams of unbuilt lands belonging to Arabs in East Jerusalem were frozen, and construction is not permitted on them. Altogether 9,500 dunams of built-up territory remain in their hands, upon which they are permitted to build.

The method used in the time of Teddy Kollek's rule to transfer land to the Jews was to color privately owned Arab land green on the map: This was a marker indicating that those territories were intended, as it were, for public purposes, for the creation of green space and were forbidden for construction. After several years some of these territories were "thawed," confiscated, and Jewish neighborhoods were built on them. Today, the "Shu'afat Ridge" neighborhood, intended for Orthodox Jews from Canada, is now going up, and two new neighborhoods are planned—"Mount Wall" in the south and "East Gate" between Neve Ya'akov and French Hill, as well as an area of Jewish housing in the heart of the Arab neighborhood of Ra's al-'Amud. Confiscation can strike any Arab at any time: Members of the Syrian Orthodox community of East Jerusalem prior to 1967 jointly purchased 82 dunams in a valley planted with olive trees, in order to build their homes there, as well as a church and school. The plan was thwarted by the Israeli Government, which colored the territory green. More than 20 years after their land was declared green territory upon which construction was prohibited, they received news that foreclosure orders had been issued against them for accumulated city taxes that they had never been asked to pay, in the amount of hundreds of thousands of shekels. At the same time they found out that their land, bordering on the foothills of Gilo, had been "thawed" for purposes of highway construction. The municipality calculated the amount of compensation for the land that was confiscated according to its low value, as land upon which construction was prohibited; it may yet agree to cut the debt by the amount of compensation. Those who pass today along the highway in the paved section between Gilo and Tantur will notice houses under construction to the side of the road: a new neighborhood, a kind of extension of Gilo.

West Jerusalem has a master plan; East Jerusalem has only point-by-point master plans, that have applied over the course of many long years only to its Jewish neighborhoods; to this day master plans have been approved for only six Arab neighborhoods, and eight others have been

awaiting approval for 10 years already. In 1980 the Municipal Council submitted a plan pointing to the need to build 18,000 housing units for the Arab population of the city. None of it was carried out. Since then this population has grown from 114,800 to 155,500 people. Assuming five people per unit, about 26,000 housing units needed to be built for Arabs in East Jerusalem. The lack of housing and the overcrowding led to the construction of 5,000 units, many of them unlicensed. In 1990, for example, construction permits were issued for 3,000 housing units in Jerusalem; of those, 150 were issued to Arabs. According to these statistics, gathered by former Municipal Council member Sara Kaminker, who was appointed by Kollek to oversee the Arab neighborhoods until she resigned in protest, there are about 21,000 homeless Arab families in Jerusalem. The "Fariq" organization, a Palestinian human rights organization, says that some of these families are squeezed in with relatives and others have left the city for villages on the West Bank.

The mayor of Jerusalem, Ehud Olmert, argued forcefully to me that there is no exodus of Arabs out of the city, and that the lack of housing was caused, among other things, because "there was no control over entrance of West Bank elements into Jerusalem"; from existing statistics, it is difficult to understand where these "elements" live. He also declared that it was his intention to systematically destroy all construction in green territories, whether Jewish or Arab; but, according to him, "there is almost no such instance where Jews build a complete house on green land. This happens only among the Arabs." Sara Kaminker says that the attitude of the municipality toward construction violations always separated Jews from Arabs: With the Jews they tear down no more than the additions to a house, with the Arabs they tear down the whole house. There is also a special arrangement that allows Jews to submit a point-by-point master plan to get retroactive approval for illegal construction. "I tried twice to put through a point-by-point master plan for East Jerusalem Arabs," says Kaminker, "in order to get retroactive approval for illegal construction, and they did not let me. When a large-scale contractor built 4,000 square meters beyond what he was authorized in a Jewish neighborhood—and that means about 40 Arab houses because each of their houses is about 100 or 200 square meters—he got retroactive approval."

In the past, Kaminker says, an average of two Arab homes were destroyed every month. The policy of the new mayor is already being felt in the field: Within one week in May the municipality destroyed five homes. The trap in which the Arab residents find themselves is clear: Not only do they not get construction permits, but also with the lack of master plans and because of the coloring of confiscated lands green, they are forced to solve their housing shortage by means of illegal construction. Many hundreds of Arab homes are now planned for destruction.

Sara Kaminker relates the incident of S.P. from Sur Bahir: "One day, in the spring of 1993, I arrived at work in the municipality and saw an Arab with his entire family, babies, children, and old folk, sitting in front of

the entrance to the City Hall, with the walls plastered with signs in Hebrew and Arabic, 'Do not destroy my house.' I told him I would come back the next day with a lot of Jews and that he should bring a lot of Arabs and we would demonstrate together, and that is what happened. We demonstrated for four hours and negotiated with the Municipality of Jerusalem not to destroy his house, and in the end they agreed to leave him and his entire family—eight people—with two rooms. The rest of the house they destroyed. This man brought me a map showing me all the land he owned before they confiscated it to build Talpiot East. I located the territory—seven and a half dunams upon which they erected tens of housing units for Jews. I will never forget this all my life. He was left with one dunam of territory not intended for construction, upon which he could not get a building permit, and upon which he built the house they destroyed for him. They left him two rooms because he had nowhere to go." Tens of other families that did not demonstrate found themselves without a roof over their heads.

The minute you want to get construction approval, you find out which Jerusalem you belong to. The construction percentages for Arabs fluctuate between 15 percent and 75 percent; for Jews, up to 300 percent. The Arabs, on whose shoulders, apparently, is placed the burden of maintaining the original character of Jerusalem, can build to a height of 2 stories; the Jews, up to 8 stories. In Talpiot East, a neighborhood built on territories that belonged to Kafr Sur Bahir until 1967, there is 250-percent construction, and their construction is 8 stories. Sur Bahir, on land bordering Talpiot East, does not yet have an approved master plan, but Sara Kaminker says the intent is to approve 15 percent construction for the Arab residents, of one-story homes.

In Ra's al-'Amud there is a struggle under way over the construction of a Jewish neighborhood, on land purchased by the 'Ateret Kohanim seminary in the heart of the Arab neighborhood. Olmert claims that the prime minister, in his position as interior minister, is delaying approval of a construction plan for 1,800 Arab housing units in Ra's al-'Amud only in order to approve 132 housing units for Jews in the neighborhood.

According to Kaminker, this is a distorted presentation of the facts: In Ra's al-'Amud 1,240 Arab housing units have already existed for 30 years, and in July 1990 a plan was presented by which it would be possible to add 560 units to them. To this day the plan has not been approved by the Interior Ministry, and it is being held hostage until approval of construction for the Jews—that was presented for initial approval only a year ago. Even here the percentages of construction intended for the Arabs are 50 percent, in two-story houses, and for the Jews, on territory purchased in the same neighborhood, 112 percent and 4 stories. Olmert admits that housing solutions must be found for the Arab population and talks about a plan to erect 7,500 housing units in Bet Hanina. According to him, he is delaying the implementation because "part of the territory is green land, on

which they wanted to approve illegal construction that was carried out on territories intended to remain green."

The Battle for Orient House

The decisive campaign over the future of Jerusalem has begun, and it is felt in the frequency of proposals for a solution that are being processed and submitted by dozens of bodies, and likewise in the unending stream of declarations and provocations. It is a race to meet the date fixed in the Cairo agreement, by which discussion on the status of the city will be no later than 4 May 1996. The real turning point in the war for Jerusalem is not the declarations made by leaders of the two sides but the fact that, for the first time, the Palestinians have begun to take action to improve their position. At the initiative of Faysal al-Husayni a committee was established at the beginning of November, the purpose of which is the establishment of "The National Council for Jerusalem—Palestine," and the definition of a plan of action for the interim period. This committee, headed by Dr. Mahdi 'Abd-al-Hadi of the PASSIA Institute (the Palestinian Academic Union), in fact, put together a platform for a complete city council with all its branches, from infrastructure and construction planning to educational and health services, religion and culture, public safety and tax collection, including a proposal for the establishment of a Palestinian police force in East Jerusalem. In seminars conducted by PASSIA, they are beginning to consolidate what the Arabs of Jerusalem have not had until now: local leadership and a professional staff to devote thought to their future. Among other things there is talk of establishing a committee of experts, Palestinian and Israeli, to work together on construction planning for East Jerusalem. In other offices connected to Orient House, like the "Palestine Geographic Center," they are carefully documenting the takeover of Arab lands, tracking every new movement in the territory with an eagle eye and also drawing future maps for the negotiating table.

Khalil Tufaqji, the director of the Geographic Center, also serves as a member of the security committee for the Taba talks under the auspices of the PLO and directly subordinate to Faysal al-Husayni. In his hand is a detailed archive of maps and construction plans for Jerusalem from the period of the mandate and Jordanian rule and since the Israeli annexation up to the present. He opened the Orient House office in 1983, the Israelis closed it twice. Over the last year, since the beginning of the peace talks, Tufaqji has been working hard: Apart from drawing the Palestinian maps for the discussions on Gaza and the West Bank, he is preparing a large project on Jerusalem with Canadian Government financing. The project demonstrates with the aid of maps and sketches the Israeli courses of action—from the establishment of neighborhoods to the paving of highways.

Tufaqji claims that Ehud Olmert is now trying to continue the Jewish spread eastward, into territory outside the jurisdiction of greater Jerusalem, via a neighborhood called "East Gate," that will be built across from

Highway 9 and that will connect Ma'alei Adumim with Pisgat Ze'ev. Tufaqi holds the master plans of the Municipality of Jerusalem's Planning Committee for those few Arab neighborhoods already approved, and uses them to show the exploitation of Palestinian lands in Jerusalem. Kafr 'Isawiyah, for example, had 10,417 dunams in the British period, 8,000 dunams were condemned by the state and only 666 dunams of what remained were approved as part of the master plan, and of those 158.4 dunams were declared green territory. The territory permitted for construction that remained to the inhabitants of the village (in 1993 they numbered 4,700 people): 362 dunams. The situation is similar in al-Tur, whose lands spread over 8,808 dunams in the British period, but today only 1,020 dunams are left, of which only 490 dunams are permitted for construction. Tufaqi says that the plan Mayor Ehud Olmert is talking about for solving the housing problems in Bet Hanina via the addition of 7,500 housing units there, is a paper plan. In practice, because of various problems of land ownership and the municipality's requirement of owners to voluntarily relinquish territories for public needs, it is impossible to build more than about 500 housing units in the territory intended for expansion in Bet Hanina. They are talking about an area permitted for construction, the size of which according to the master plan is 2,305 dunams; another 2,100 dunams were allocated as green space. The remainder of the Bet Hanina territory was confiscated for the benefit of Neve Ya'aqov, Pisgat Ze'ev, Atarot and Highway 1 that connects the Jewish neighborhoods to the center of the city. The housing shortage in the neighborhood and the fact that until 1986 there was no master plan, resulted in 200 houses being built on territory that was later declared green territory; now Olmert is demanding that these houses be destroyed. Sara Kaminker notes that this is an extraordinary policy that had no counterpart even in East Jerusalem's most difficult times.

The reports of the establishment of the "National Council for Jerusalem—Palestine" have aroused Ehud Olmert's anger, as well as strong opposition in the government. According to Olmert there are intentions to act against the council and "to restrict various activities carried out in the eastern part of Jerusalem by Palestinian bodies, intended to undermine the city's status as a united city"; on this matter, he says, he is working very closely with Police Minister Moshe Shahal. Olmert also intends to continue establishing facts on the ground: the creation of a Jewish strip from Neve Ya'aqov to the center of the city is a very high priority from his point of view, and he also wants to expand the borders of the city eastward and to connect its area of jurisdiction with Ma'alei Adumim. "The logic that unites Jerusalem also drives its spread eastward," he says. Deputy Foreign Minister Yosi Beilin says: "The Mayor of Jerusalem is going in the opposite direction from what is needed, and I am happy that he cannot make decisions by himself on these matters."

The continuation of the policy of Judaizing Jerusalem, warns Dr. Mahdi 'Abd-al-Hadi, will pull the rug from

under the feet of the Palestinian autonomy leadership. "Our people do not see the Palestinian leaders today as liberators nor as partners, but as arbitrators and litigants. If the leaders do not return to the Palestinians their heart and center, their capital, they are doomed to failure." About his new mayor, he says: "I do not think that Ehud Olmert intends to kill the peace process at one blow. If the bullets of the murderer from Hebron, Barukh Goldstein, were the first attempt to do this, Ehud Olmert's plans could be the last straw. I invite Olmert to be logical."

The Palestinians have a clear interest not to wait another two years, until the conclusion of the debate over Jerusalem. They claim that by then they may no longer have any land to talk about. The Israeli Government is also aware of the growing tension in the city and the activity of the Palestinian institutions there—chief among them Orient House, that already functions now as a Palestinian government center and as a kind of foreign ministry—will force it to deal with the problem earlier than expected. The government positions, as Yosi Beilin presents them, are based on several principles: The first principle is that the city will remain united, and this is the only principle that the Palestinians also agree to, since in their opinion, as well, the city is not to be divided physically. There is no agreement on the other principles: According to the government's position, Jerusalem will be Israel's capital exclusively. All of it, including the territory annexed in 1967, will remain under Israeli sovereignty, and it will contain only one municipality. Beilin suggests adopting a plan for independent administrations to be elected in the various quarters of the city, that would conduct their affairs autonomously, within the framework of one municipality, a plan raised in his day by Teddy Kollek, based on Meron Benvenisti's "quarters" plan (Benvenisti's plan also included Jordanian sovereignty over part of the city, an idea that is unacceptable to Kollek and Beilin). In his view the administration's plan—with the addition of guaranteed free access to the holy places of all faiths—would satisfy the Palestinians' demands; but the Palestinians reject the plan outright. The Israeli positions assumes in advance that there exists a national consensus here and that united Jerusalem is a fact.

Pride and Prejudice

In the abandoned Hindiyyah building, opposite Damascus Gate, the IPCRI Institute opened three years ago, a center for Israeli-Palestinian research and information headed by Hanna Sinyurah and Moshe Amirav. The institute was established at the private initiative of its director, Dr. Gershon Basqin, and he is winning support and financing today from research funds in the United States and Europe. "The myth of consensus," is Basqin's term for the general assumption of Israeli politicians on the right and the left, according to which there are no more than 5 percent of Israelis who are willing to give up full sovereignty over Jerusalem. Basqin tries to neutralize the discussion over Jerusalem from what he calls "codes fixed in advance," and to examine what the real positions of the Israeli public are. He claims that most

Israelis are completely ignorant of the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and have no interest in them. The only interest most Israelis have in continuing control over Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem is security concerns: places like Sur Bahir, Jabal Mukabir, Umm-Tuba, al-Sawahirah—all of which are part of "united Jerusalem"—are of no significance for them.

The point agreed upon by all Palestinians, according to the IPCRI, is that East Jerusalem must be the capital of Palestine. Furthermore, says Basqin, "we found one axiom on both sides: No one is interested in granting international status to Jerusalem apart from the Vatican. Our proposal is based on the recognition that Jerusalem has two populations, of differing national identity, that do not want to belong to the other. We accepted as axiomatic the supposition that the city cannot be physically divided and that there will be no boundary dividing Israel and Palestine. We suggest a political division by building systems of cooperation. There will be two city councils, with two mayors, as well as committees or joint bodies for economic development, tourism and coordination in infrastructure development, etc."

Dr. Meron Benvenisti, as noted, was the one who consolidated the proposal for division into quarters, which keeps popping up since then in various forms, even from elements within the Israeli Government. The proposal most acceptable to the Palestinians is that which divides the city into two municipalities and two capitals. Over the years it has been raised in various forms by Palestinian personages such as Dr. Walid Halidi in 1978, foreign statesmen and scholars such as Professor Antonio Qassa (in charge of human rights for the Council of Europe), as well as in joint proposals to Israelis and Palestinians such as the proposal of Dr. Sari Nusaybah and Dr. Mark Heiler in their 1991 book. Its main points are to leave Israeli sovereignty over the western part of the city and to institute Palestinian or Jordanian sovereignty (singly or jointly) over the eastern part, with the possibility of international supervision of the Old City.

Possibilities have also been raised for a joint and united capital of the two nations, a confederation with Jordan and Palestine, a symbolic and administrative capital of the Palestinian entity in the Muslim quarter that would acquire a status similar to that of Vatican City (the David Ish-Shalom proposal of 1987) alongside the Israeli capital, and several other tangled possibilities. In the final analysis, the only agreement achieved thus far has been the agreement to postpone the final discussion "to a later date." That date is approaching, and it would seem that we need to get rid of a considerable load of instincts and prejudices if we are to get through it peacefully.

Concern Over Renewed Syrian-Russian Relations

944100884 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jun 94 p.2

[Article by Gay Bekhor]

[Text] The renewed tightening of relations between Syria and Russia reached its peak at the beginning of the month when the Russian chief of staff, Mikhail Petrovich Kolysynkov, landed in Damascus leading a senior military and economic delegation for talks with the Syrian leadership.

Previously, in April, an agreement was initialed between the Russian vice president, Oleg Soskovich, and the Syrian defense minister, Mustafa Talas, on military cooperation. General Kolysynkov came to Syria to start and propel the military-economic agreement, which aims at solving the problem of Damascus' military debt since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This debt is estimated at \$11-12 billion and it appears that the Syrians have begun to pay it in increments in order to move the new military-economic agreement forward.

The renewed rapprochement is what concerns Israel because Damascus, apparently, will be able to acquire for itself, once again, an ally who will support it militarily. In fact, during his last visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin raised the issue of Russian-Syrian rapprochement and reached an agreement that Russia not sell fighter planes to Syria.

Western intelligence persistently claims that despite Russian commitments to Israel, Syria will acquire a dozen Tupolev-37 combat aircraft and almost 50 Mig-29's.

The talks between the Russian chief of staff and the Syrian upper echelon centered on what the two sides defined as renewed and serious cooperation "on all levels"—weapons sales, developing and strengthening military ties in areas of training, military innovations, and the exchange of military knowledge. With this, the Russians are insisting that they become the constructive side in the regional peace process and not only support the Arab side as in the past.

From Syria's perspective, they are considering that this framework also be moved forward after Damascus lost, over the last years, its standing as a strategic ally. From the Russian perspective, this is an opportunity to renew arms sales to the region and to find an additional channel for integration into the Middle East peace process under whose auspices it is being conducted.

Syria found itself facing an Israel acquiring more weapons from the United States, in addition to Israel's accelerated weapons development program as exemplified by the Arrow missile which is seen by the Syrians as a huge military-strategic leap by Israel, causing them great concern.

The majority of Syria's strategic weapons over the past years have been acquired from North Korea and China, the only two countries where ballistic missiles or knowledge to build missile systems could be acquired. This was while Russia was busy with its own burning internal affairs.

An additional source of international concern is the effort by Iran to develop its own guided missiles with the aid of advanced technology imported from Germany and Japan.

LEBANON

Government Steps Up War on Illegal Drugs

Foreign Involvement Criticized

94AF0221X London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 19 May 94 p 2

[Text] Beirut—A delegation from the United Nations International Anti-Drug Commission will arrive in Beirut on 6 June and will meet with the Cabinet's anti-drug committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Michel al-Murr and with senior officials in the command of the internal security forces. AL-HAYAH has learned that representatives of the international commission will make field tours to areas where cannabis was formerly grown. Accompanied by the commander of internal security's judicial police, Brigadier General Salim Salim, and the anti-narcotics bureau, the commission will visit a number of cities and villages of al-Biqa' to investigate what the Committee to Prevent the Growing of Cannabis is accomplishing.

A Lebanese authority said that in over two years the government has made significant steps in stopping the cultivation of drug-producing plants. Lebanese security forces in cooperation with Syrian forces in al-Biqa' have raided the towns and villages involved with these crops and have succeeded in destroying most of the crops.

The authority stated that the government, not satisfied with destroying the illegal crops, has gone on to prevent their being grown and has taken all steps and measures to stop manufacturing and smuggling operations. Factories have been destroyed and those tending them have been detained.

He expressed hope that "the Commission, in cooperation with Syrian forces, would make a field survey to ascertain the extent of the government's commitment to preventing farmers from returning to the illegal crops." He stated that "the International Commission would ultimately draft a detailed report that would remove Lebanon's name from the list of drug-exporting countries—unlike past years, when the report spoke of our country as being in the forefront of drug-producing and manufacturing countries. Smuggling routes had been brought under control, as shown by the amount of material regularly seized at the sea, land, and air transit points linking Lebanon with the outside world."

The authority indicated that "the United Nations, whose reports had unfairly portrayed Lebanon's effort to combat drug production and export, should actively contribute to the programs the government has designed to encourage alternative crops, especially in the Ba'l-abakk-Hirmil area and barren areas of Mount Lebanon

and the North." He noted that "the government now complains that the amount of international aid is still below the level needed to encourage farmers to respond to repeated campaigns by Lebanese and Syrian security forces to prevent drug cultivation and stop all forms of smuggling and manufacturing; yet a number of countries that produce smaller amounts of drugs than Lebanon receive large amounts of aid."

He stated that international programs—those of the United Nations or those designed or being designed by the United States and the European countries—had earmarked large sums as aid for drug-producing countries, but that Lebanon had not benefited from them—at least as much as needed." He hoped that the United Nations would "try to persuade the countries that budget large sums for combatting drugs to include Lebanon, so that the country could benefit from aid that would allow it to encourage alternative crops."

The authority held that "the international, European, and American aid from which Lebanon benefits remains primarily restricted to strengthening monitoring and inspection agencies set up at the Lebanese-Syrian border, Beirut international airport, and Lebanese ports, and that the relevant security forces had succeeded in taking advantage of the aid."

The authority thought that "most of the illegal funds that used to flow into Beirut have stopped." He attributed this to "the ending of the state of war by an international and regional resolution supported by Syria and having local approval. As a result of this agreement, a number of countries had stopped giving aid to most of the Lebanese parties."

Antidrug Commission Reviewed

94AF0221Y London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 8 Jun 94 p 3

[Text] Beirut—The chairman of the United Nations International Anti-Drug Commission, Mr. Muhammad al-Farjani, expressed satisfaction with the Lebanese government's efforts to destroy illegal crops and combat drug manufacturing and smuggling, affirming that the government had been fully responsive in destroying such crops.

Al-Farjani, accompanied by a number of international anti-narcotics experts, met yesterday with the Cabinet's anti-drug committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Michel al-Murr. Also present were Agriculture Minister 'Adil Qirtas, Interior Minister Bisharah Mirhij, representatives of the command of the army and security forces, and representatives of local humanitarian organizations active in the field.

The meeting began at 1100, chaired by al-Murr. Its first hour was restricted to the Lebanese side; then al-Farjani and the delegation accompanying him joined in. Afterward, the international official said: "The international agency's task is to evaluate regional and international performance in combatting drugs. We perceived great

efforts by the government to eliminate the raising of drugs in the al-Biqa' Valley and political will to combat the raising of them."

Regarding help in introducing alternative crops, he said: "We have a program that the United Nations is carrying out in cooperation with the Lebanese government to eliminate the growing of drugs, introduce alternative crops, and educate farmers. We shall present a report this December to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, evaluating the extent of compliance by all governments on whose territory drugs are grown."

He explained: "We are active throughout the world with the assistance of 13 international experts in the field of combatting the raising of drugs. We personally monitor the extent of countries' compliance, calling attention to everything we find out. If we find gaps on the part of some countries, we move quickly to notify them so that they can remedy the situation."

According to AL-HAYAH's exclusive information, al-Farjani and the international experts took away a "better than good" impression of the government's compliance with the International Anti-Drug Commission's role. They stated that they had information "that the fields of illegal crops had been completely destroyed, and that they would make a field reconnaissance tour to confirm the fact."

The Lebanese side spoke about "how it had not yet sensed the required encouragement from the United Nations, European countries, and the United States, which earmark large sums of money to combat drug smuggling, manufacturing, and growing." He indicated that "last year's United Nations report had not been fair to Lebanon: it had been biased and had contained a series of distortions, portraying this country as if it were supplying the entire world with drugs." He asked, "Could Lebanon in the past logically have produced the quantity given in the report—10s of thousands of tons?"

The Lebanese side raised the role being played by the ministries involved in combatting drugs. "They have prepared an integrated plan that needs funding to enable it to ensure alternative crops. Farmers, in particular, complain that they lack the necessary support, since the government with its scarce material resources cannot respond to their demands."

The discussion, it was learned, also focused on the government's program. Financial coverage for it is being waited for, particularly since it not only deals with supporting alternative crops, but envisions the establishment of health centers to treat addicts and educate farmers who had been growing drugs.

The Lebanese side hoped that the report would come out in favor of the role the Lebanese Government is playing through its security agencies in cooperation with Syrian forces in destroying illegal crops, combatting smuggling, and seizing and closing factories.

Al-Farjani, heading a delegation of international experts, will go to al-Biqa' this Friday for a field tour to ascertain the extent of the government's response. He will meet the command of the Syrian forces in al-Biqa' in the presence of internal security officers in the Anti-Narcotics Bureau.

The International Commission team visited the French embassy at Mahallat Mar Niquila yesterday afternoon and met with the officials whom the French government has assigned to check on the arrangements and measures implemented by the Lebanese government.

Law Enforcement Praised

94AF0221Z London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 10 Jun 94 p 2

[Excerpts] Beirut—[passage omitted] On the occasion of yesterday's 133d anniversary of the security forces, President al-Hirawi attended the graduation ceremony at al-Warwar Institute of 99 internal security officers who have university law degrees. [passage omitted]

President al-Hirawi added in his speech: "As we congratulate you on your anniversary, we congratulate you for your achievements that attest to your awareness of the importance of your role. We believe that your responsibilities will increase as we progress in the work of restoration. You must protect this process from those who complain of being harmed by the nation's salvation. You must combat the residues left by our ordeal—residues alien to our traditions and authentic nature. We proudly commend your brilliant success, in coordination and cooperation with your comrades in other military and security organizations, in combatting crime and outbreaks of violence and lawlessness and in combatting drugs. As a result, we are ready to announce to the entire world that Lebanon has been free of the growing of drugs since 1993. Our security forces have vigilantly monitored any attempt to mar their achievement. As head of state and supreme commander of the Armed Forces, we say to you that the resolutions of the Cabinet are clear. Implement them! Do not be lax in combatting drugs mercilessly! We commemorate your sacrifices; your martyrs shall remain exalted beacons in your organization and in the annals of Lebanon. Remember that your achievement in this field and your record of confiscating quantities of drugs stored in secret buildings or uncovering smuggling operations to or from Lebanon, in cooperation with fraternal Syria and international agencies, has earned you as officers, noncommissioned officers, and individuals the esteem and gratitude of your country and the approval of the world." [passage omitted]

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

New Shabwah Governor Interviewed

94AE0130A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 28 May 94 p 3

[Telephone interview with Shaykh Ahmad Bin-Farid al-Suraymah, the governor of Shabwah, by 'Abdallah

Hammudah; place and date not given—first two paragraphs are AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction]

[Text] London—Shaykh Ahmad Bin-Farid al-Suraymah's voice came over the telephone via satellite communications. It sounded rough but calm, like the mountains and desert sands of the southern Yemeni governorate of Shabwah, where he holds the post of governor in the administration of the Democratic Republic of Yemen, which was declared last week. In a calm tone, he expressed a profound view of the future and the crisis now raging in his country.

Friendship broke the barrier of roughness, helped by the fact that he represents a new breed of Yemeni leader: He received a law degree from London University; he then divided his time between armed commando activity in South Yemen against British colonialism and then against the Socialist Party on the one hand, and commercial activities in the Arabian Peninsula and Europe on the other hand, before returning recently to political activity. The following is an interview with him.

[Hammudah] People say that you were appointed governor of Shabwah in the context of the trend of the Yemeni Socialist Party leadership toward forming new political alliances. Could you comment on this?

[Al-Suraymah] That is correct. The appointment indicates clearly and proves beyond doubt that the Socialist Party—under the leadership of brother 'Ali Salim al-Bid, the president of the Democratic Republic of Yemen—has fulfilled its promise. You can go back to the call which I addressed to him from the heart to the heart, in which I said that there were indications that al-Bid and his party were opening to, and cooperating with, opposition groups and parties in good faith. I said that if this were true, we would help them and ally with them.

We have indeed supported and allied with them, not based on conditions, but on good faith. They have proven the sincerity of their intentions by forming a presidency council and appointing local government leaders in the governorates.

[Hammudah] What is your opinion regarding the decision by President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to appoint Ahmad 'Ali Muhsin governor of Shabwah?

[Al-Suraymah] This is a joke on the part of brother President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. For your information, I do not covet the post of governor, minister, or even president. I have enough work and private activities to consume my energy and interests. However, when I was asked to assume responsibility for a ministry or the post of governor of Shabwah, I deemed that the circumstances and critical difficulties facing South Yemen required every honorable patriot to place the common interest over selfishness and personal interests.

Therefore, I accepted the post of governor of Shabwah, not because I covet it, but to serve the governorate to which I belong. I am willing at any time after the crisis is

over and sovereignty, security, and the law [are in place] to relinquish this post to whomever is elected by the people of the governorate of Shabwah.

The decision to appoint Ahmad 'Ali Muhsin is considered a joke on the part of brother President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih.

[Hammudah] However, you accepted the appointment to be governor of Shabwah from the Democratic Yemen leadership. What therefore is your position on the issue of Yemeni unity?

[Al-Suraymah] My position on the issue of Yemeni unity is as follows: I hope that brother President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih will review the memorandum I submitted to him on the occasion of the events of January 1986, when I met him at the seat of the chief executive in Sanaa and emphasized the importance of his support for us to establish Yemeni unity on democratic foundations. I am among the believers in Yemeni unity, contingent on justice and equality.

However, their intentions have been proved to be the opposite. Therefore, I support separation and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Yemen to achieve true Yemeni unity based on justice, equality, and the rule of law.

[Hammudah] What then is your working program that you envision in the scope of your current assignment?

[Al-Suraymah] I began my program before my appointment as governor of Shabwah. It consists of eliminating the suffering of the people of Shabwah. Several months ago, at my own expense, I began to build roads and renovate hospitals under the slogan of "construction." I call upon any party who denies this to send a commission of inquiry to these project sites. Given that I have begun vital, development projects at my own expense, my orientation is clearly to serve the citizen and to raise his living and social standard and everything connected to it.

[Hammudah] Let us return to the reasons for your changed position on the Socialist Party, which you fought in the past. What are they?

[Al-Suraymah] The world has changed and attitudes have changed. The Socialist Party has changed. As for myself, I have not changed.

[Hammudah] Regarding the current fighting in Shabwah, what happened? How were northern forces able to penetrate our territory?

[Al-Suraymah] The truth is that what happened in Shabwah occurred before my most recent arrival and appointment as governor. What happened is that the brothers in the north concentrated regular battalions of the Republican Guard, strike forces, the 6th Brigade, and more than 20,000 men of the Northern tribes under the command of Colonel Muhammad Isma'il, the maternal uncle of President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih.

They committed those forces along with hundreds of millions of riyals and promises. They were thus able to neutralize most of the tribes in Shabwah. Also, the resistance of Southern army units was limited in its effect, because the Northern forces had a 10-to-1 advantage in terms of manpower, tanks, and guns.

In any case, they did not gain control of Shabwah. They only penetrated forward lines in Bayhan and gained control of the city of 'Ataq, the capital of the governorate. This area is no more than a third of Shabwah's territory. As I speak with you, I am 40 kilometers from 'Ataq, whereas the governorate of Shabwah is 250 kilometers in length.

[Hammudah] What is your estimate of the current military situation in the governorate of Shabwah? How are you resisting Northern forces?

[Al-Suraymah] It would be illogical for me to discuss this now. We are in a situation of combat operations. We will speak about this later.

[Hammudah] When do you expect the situation to be decided?

[Al-Suraymah] I believe that the situation will be decided within three weeks.

[Hammudah] How true is the news originating in Sanaa regarding the Northern forces' use of the governorate of Shabwah as a base from which to advance to Hadramawt?

[Al-Suraymah] It is true that such talk originates in the North. The Northerners do not conceal their objective. However, how can they advance to Hadramawt when we are still resisting them here in Shabwah? If they attempt to advance 10 or 20 kilometers, we will confront them, and they will lose. If they dream of reaching Hadramawt, their dreams will continue to be dreams having no place in reality.

[Hammudah] Why has the group of Shabwah tribes, whose name you have changed to "construction tribes," not been able to repel the Northern penetration? Is this due to your personal absence for some time?

[Al-Suraymah] I do not like to talk about my personal role. However, we have shifted from being groups in a state of combat to being groups in a state of construction. We have begun to build roads and renovate hospitals. Perhaps you remember that I said in my previous interview, "If they return we shall return." They have now returned, and we have also returned.

[Hammudah] It seems that the combat group of the Shabwah tribes was unofficial and temporary.

[Al-Suraymah] It has now become permanent in order to complete the liberation of all areas of the governorate of Shabwah from the foreign occupation. After that, it will return to its role as a construction group.

[Hammudah] However, it seems that the Shabwah tribes do not have a combative nature like the tribes in the North.

[Al-Suraymah] We are more combative than they. However, we are civilized at the same time.

[Hammudah] Let me ask again: To what extent are the people of Shabwah helping to defend it?

[Al-Suraymah] Shabwah depends primarily on its tribes in the current struggle against the Northern invasion.

[Hammudah] Is there fighting near the oil sites in the governorate? Did the Northern penetration target the oil sites?

[Al-Suraymah] The fighting has not occurred there, because the oil sites are far away, in the depth of the desert.

[Hammudah] Are the figures on the losses in fighting in the governorate of Shabwah true?

[Al-Suraymah] Precise figures are currently lacking due to the largeness of the governorate's territory and the unavailability of accurate information. However, their killed and wounded are five times greater than our killed and wounded. There are indications that about 2,000 of their men have been killed.

[Hammudah] Why do you refer to the Northern leader with the word "brother." Is there some truth to what some foreign observers say when they described Yemenis in the North and the South as brother enemies?

[Al-Suraymah] (Laughing) That is completely true.

[box, p 3]

The New Governor, the Leader of the "Construction" Tribes Group

- He is Ahmad Farid Muhammad Bin-Farid (known by the nickname al-Suraymah, given to him by his father).
- He was born in 1945 in the city of al-Sa'id, which is the capital of Upper al-'Awaliq and considered to be a key city in the governorate of Shabwah at present.
- His dispute with the National Front, which took power following South Yemen's independence from British colonialism on 30 November 1967, stems from the fact that his family, al-Farid, ruled Upper al-'Awaliq before independence.
- He received his elementary schooling in al-Sa'id and his preparatory schooling in Aden. He completed his secondary schooling at Aden College.
- He was admitted to London University in Britain to study law. He received a license in law with honors in July 1967.
- He returned to Aden after graduating in mid-1967. He participated in commando military operations

against British forces until independence was achieved.

- Immediately after independence, bruising battles erupted between members of his family and the National Front. Many members of his family and other patriotic forces were compelled to leave Democratic Yemen for neighboring countries in the Arabian Peninsula.
- He returned to Yemen a few months later in early 1968. In a guerrilla war against the National Front's authority, which lasted several years, he conducted mobile battles in the mountains of al-'Awaliq and the neighboring desert in coordination with patriotic tribes and forces in the areas extending between Shabwah, Hadramawt, and al-Mahrah. In these activities, he exploited the tension that then prevailed in relations between the ruling regime in South Yemen and the neighboring countries.
- After the countries of the Arabian Peninsula recognized South Yemen, he desisted from armed struggle and engaged in economic activities. He also continued coordination and political activity with the tribes and different patriotic forces.
- After Yemeni, regional, and international conditions changed, he returned to the governorate of Shabwah in mid-1993 to help rebuild. He established a construction company, which began its activity in the construction of a road between 'Ataq and al-Musayni'ah [name as transliterated] and the construction of mosques, schools, health units, etc., at his own expense.
- He entered into an alliance with the Socialist Party based on an orientation toward economic freedom, political plurality, and the struggle against the hegemony of totalitarianism. He was appointed governor of Shabwah by 'Ali Salim al-Bid in the latter's fourth decision as president of Democratic Yemen.

AFGHANISTAN

Sayyaf Sends Open Letter to Muslims

94AE0122A Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
17 May 94 pp 34-36

[Article by Professor 'Abdol Rab Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Ettihad-e Eslami (Islamic Union)]

[Text] My brother Muslim, after keeping my silence for close to two years, I would like to tell you and the people of the Islamic nation the story of the conspiracy and the story of the calamities caused by the internal wars between several factions of mojahedin, which have frustrated the supporters of the jihad.

Perhaps you have learned from media reports of some of the tragedies that have befallen the Afghani, Muslim people following the fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan—that people, which eased its pain throughout the 14 years of its jihad with the hope of the reward of the hereafter and expectations of an honorable, Islamic life under the banner of "There is no God but God" in a rightly-guided Islamic system after the liberation of their country and the resumption of their life in the bosom of august Islam, after more than 2 million martyrs had died defending Islam, its territory, and its sacred precinct.

My brother Muslim, you were waiting for the day when the communist regime in Afghanistan would fall and you would be gladdened by Islamic rule and the sight of Islam's flag fluttering over Afghanistan's villages again. You were certain that the establishment of Islamic rule in Afghanistan would remedy many of the nation's pains, eliminate some of its afflictions, and build a road for mankind leading to the people's release from servitude to men for servitude to the one almighty God. You were certain that it would renew hope in the hearts of the people of the Islamic nation of again ascending to the heights of strength and pride. All of those who were persecuted before the eyes of the world were hoping for the strong wind of mercy to issue from the jihad's horizons to whisk from their faces the dust of degradation, oppression, and totalitarianism. The collapse of the Berlin wall and the liberation of the Islamic republics in Central Asia strengthened this hope in them more than ever. However, you and they have been shocked by what has happened and is happening in Afghanistan. You, Muslims, and the Afghani people have been shocked and have become frustrated. You now shudder at the mention of the name Afghanistan, which used to enjoy an exalted status among you. You have begun to turn away from the Afghanis in an attempt to forget this people. This, after you had taken pride in this people, imitating its style of dress and choosing Afghani names for your children, all of which you were right to do. However, it is the right of the Afghanis and fellow Muslims that you hear their story and become familiar with the causes of this discord and setback, so that you will perhaps reexamine your position on the Afghanis. I have lived the

cause since its inception. I have become familiar with its different angles. I have lived in its environment. I have suffered and been burned by its tragedies. I want to tell you the story briefly. God knows that I do not wish to show favor or enmity toward another at the expense of my religion. And I am not, God forbid, one who sells his religion for another's temporal world. I will relate to you the causes and factors of this discord and setback. God is our recourse and support.

The World's Fear of the Russians Before the Start of the Jihad

My brother Muslim, you know that the world used to fear Russian imperialism. It feared its ruthlessness and tyranny. It feared the speed with which Russian hegemony spread. No one imagined that there was anyone who would resist or have the audacity to stop the red communist advance. When this wariness and this concept governed people's minds, Russia advanced on Afghanistan following the impotence of the [Afghani] mercenary communist regime in the face of the blows delivered by the mojahedin. At that time, people generally thought that resisting Russia in Afghanistan was unrealistic and unthinkable. When the jihad resistance began, news of it spread. The people did not believe this news, considering it exaggerated. When the jihad blossomed and took shape, the possibility of opposing the communist advance began to preoccupy them. They began to seek ways to reach, support, urge, and encourage the mojahedin. We saw two types of people who were prepared to strengthen and support the mojahedin:

1. Muslims who had always yearned for the restoration of the Islamic nation's time-honored strength and past glory. They regarded this jihad as the beginning of the end of the degradation that has afflicted Muslims and as a way to reestablish rightly-guided Islamic rule. They hastened to support the jihad.
2. Irreligious persons and Westerners who were highly alarmed at the spread of communist hegemony. They regarded the mojahedin as a force that would fight and shatter the elan of their enemy. They seized this opportunity and took advantage of the circumstances, hastening to support the jihad and encourage the mojahedin. Western broadcasts announced and publicized it. Concurrently, Western leaders used the Russians' interference in Afghanistan as a pretext to apply international pressure on, censure, and arouse the world against Russia. They considered this episode a jumping-off place from which to pursue their archenemy, the mere mention of whom had caused them to tremble only yesterday.

The situation continued this way for years. Then, signs of Russian regret began to appear, as did signs of Russia's inability to uproot the mojahedin or at least stop their movement. The situation reached the point where the Russians found it difficult to imagine staying in Afghanistan. Concurrently, the mojahedin began to emerge as an entity. Hope began to grow that the mojahedin would beat their enemies. At that time, the

West began to be assailed by apprehensions over the emergence of the *mujahedin* as a military force or an Islamic entity. The West had intended initially to support the *mujahedin* in order to stop the red advance. It had not intended to cause the definitive collapse of the Soviet Union. Nor did it want the *mujahedin* to achieve a victory in the name of a religion, in the name of Islam. The West maneuvered to keep Afghanistan under the secularists' control once the Russians' left it. When the Russians decided to leave Afghanistan, saying that their intervention there had become a hemorrhaging wound for them, the situation became more critical for the West. It decided to negotiate with the Russians over a way to prevent the *mujahedin* from obtaining power and to unify the secularists and communists with a view toward the secularists and communists taking over in Afghanistan after Russia's retreat.

To this end, negotiations were held in Geneva. The meeting between the American and Russian heads of state in Malta was held for the same purpose, and UN plans and proposals monitored by UN Representative Benon Sevan also had the same end in mind.

They used all possible means to attempt to penetrate the ranks of several "fundamentalist" organizations and to entice their leaders with leading political positions. They also tried earnestly to exacerbate disagreements and to incite discord and war between *mujahedin* organizations. Fourteen years of experience and observation of visible reality have shown us that some organizations guaranteed for Islam's enemies the perpetuation of disagreements and internal battles between the *mujahedin*. Thus, we have seen several organizations appearing as a party to every entanglement and internal disagreement in every province and district. Our enemies also encouraged many of the organizations to issue a general amnesty for the criminal communists to facilitate the communists' infiltration of *mujahedin* ranks. However, despite all of this, God's enemies were unable to prevent the *mujahedin* from reaching power. Despite all of the barriers and obstacles in the arena, the government of the *mujahedin* was able to enter Kabul. This increased the anger and ire of Islam's enemies and aroused their rancor even more. It should be said, parenthetically, that one of the mistakes made in this regard was the retention of communist elements in the army and in several other, key purviews. For a while, the emphasis on retaining such elements was a consequence of the obsession of the leaders of the *Hezb-e Eslami* [Islamic Party] with obtaining power. That obsession convinced the government to maintain, unnecessarily, a militia to counter the party's attacks. We believe that the retention of these elements was among the government's biggest mistakes. The government's use of these elements was impermissible.

When the enemies saw that the *mujahedin* were on the verge of establishing an Islamic government and had only to banish a few communists from their ranks, correct several mistakes made by the government, and eliminate several perceptions regarding the government, all of which were easy tasks, they [the enemies] began to implement

their most recent and dangerous plan, which is to incite a civil war by exploiting the desire and thirst of several *mujahedin* to obtain power. These enemies began to tell those obsessed with power that their actions in this regard were correct. They hastened to strengthen and support them. They also created thousands of obstacles in the way of the *mujahedin* government, impeding its way and besieging it from every quarter. Not satisfied with these measures, they established secret relations with a group of militias and supported them with enormous, awesome capabilities. They ordered these militias to maintain the balance between the warring factions. They stressed that whenever one side weakened and was about to collapse, these militias should buttress it and prevent it from collapsing. In this way, they have been able to perpetuate the fighting. Their objectives in doing so are:

1. To damage the reputation of the *jihad* and the *mujahedin* and thus erode their heroic acts, erase their signs of glory—that they inscribed with their own blood—reduce their self-worth, and diminish them in the eyes of the enemies of the *jihad*.
2. To damage Islamic movements in the world by presenting them to the world as desiring only their self-interests and as using the name of Islam as a pretext to achieve their base goals. Therefore, you find that the enemies of Islam and the Islamic call (the foreigners' mouthpieces) have said what they have said regarding the rightness of the *jihad*, the *mujahedin*, and Islamic movements in general, and they have greatly exploited events in Afghanistan.
3. To exhaust the people's strength, so that they become disgusted at the mere mention of the *mujahedin*, whose advent they had so thirsted and yearned for. The enemies' intent here is to bring the situation to the point where the people would become satisfied with anyone other than the *mujahedin*.
4. To delay the reconstruction of Afghanistan to make the people more averse to the *mujahedin*.
5. To frustrate supporters of the *jihad* and cause them to hesitate to help and stand by the *mujahedin*.
6. To cause a depletion of the ammunition and assets currently held by the *mujahedin* to make it easy for God's enemies to impose a mercenary government on this warrior people once again.

The preceding are some of the enemies' goals in inciting a war.

For our part, as soon as we arrived in Kabul, we began our attempt to prevent the implementation of the enemies' plan. We tried as much as possible to make the parties who had been bought or deceived (to put it more nicely) understand that the incitement of war is in no way in their or our interests. They were not convinced. Instead, they insisted on carrying out the enemies' plans, employing one maneuver after another until the matter reached this level which you see. When the communists,

Isma'ilis [Seveners Shiite sect], and several Shiite parties containing a number of communists learned of my attempts to reconcile and resolve the problems between the mojahedin through negotiations and mutual understanding, they agreed with each other to launch a damaging war against our mojahedin forces in western Kabul, where I reside. Whenever I would assemble the leaders of warring parties to reconcile them, they would renew their attacks against our positions to prevent us from continuing the reconciliation process, because they still believe that their survival depends on a continuation of the discord and fighting between the mojahedin. They regard reconciliation between the mojahedin as an act of war and an end to themselves. In this configuration, as a result of the bloody battles that they waged against our mojahedin, close to 2,000 of my followers fell victim to the efforts toward reconciliation between warring groups of mojahedin.

However, we have not despaired to date. We will continue our efforts to reach our goals, and we will reach them, God willing, regardless of the enemies' desire.

My brother Muslim, our enemies have been able to achieve a large portion of their objectives by exploiting the personal desires of some mojahedin, who defeated the enemy on the battlefield, but were then defeated by the enemy's ruses and conspiracies. Pity the holy warrior who has sold his religion for another's temporal world and will not even enjoy his temporal world!

My brother Muslim, do not sadden your fellow mojahedin, do not cause our enemies to take malicious pleasure in their mishaps, do not delight in their circumstances, do not leave their side, and do not remain neutral toward them. That is the aim of the enemies' conspiracies. The enemies want to distance you from me to weaken my ranks and strength. If you do so, God forbid, you will have carried out a part of the enemies' plan without even being aware of doing so.

My honorable brother, the mojahedin are not all mercenaries. Not all of them have sold their religion for the temporal world. Hasten to stand by their side again. Wipe your enemies' noses in the dirt. Stay with the mojahedin until the goals for which your blood has mingled with their blood are achieved.

My brother Muslim, the majority of your mojahedin brothers are the same as they were before. They are still on the same line. Only a few of them have fallen into the quagmire of their base desires and into the snares of cunning and deception. You, my brother, replace your isolation from them and the offense that you take upon the mention of their names—replace them with cooperation with the mojahedin in getting out of this trap and dilemma. Stand with them more strongly than ever, because reproach does not solve a problem or cure a sickness. You are still a partner in this jihad. Moreover, you contribute to it with your blood. No one is permitted to lose the jihad. Maintain it until God permits us to achieve our hopes and goals, which shall be by the

strength of God almighty. May God bless our Master Muhammad, his family, and his companions and grant them all salvation.

INDIA

Shortcomings Seen in Rao Visit to U.S.

U.S.-Pakistani Tilt Remains

94AS0303A Jalandhar PUNJAB KESARI in Hindi
31 May 94 p 4

[Article by Punam I. Kaushish: "Two Aspects of Rao's America Trip; One Good, One Bad"]

[Text] There is a conflict between good and bad news after Rao's America trip. First, the good news. The Prime Minister's trip was great. This is stated not only by New Delhi, but also by the Prime Minister himself. He says that he is "completely satisfied." Wall Street Journal has also written, "It does not matter if the Washington press enclave is not inspired by Rao's trip, it is clear that it has encouraged Indo-American political relations, which have not been favorable under the Clinton administration."

Now the bad news. Only a week after Rao returned from his America trip America restarted its game with New Delhi. It is difficult to say whether the bubble of Indo-American friendship has burst or whether it was a part of the American game to keep India in the deception of self-satisfaction. In this context, not many know that Strobe Talbot had indicated to the Prime Minister that America would not embrace him during his visit. The Deputy Foreign Minister had told Rao this early last month before his visit. India's friend, Senator Moynihan (who had been America's ambassador to India) stayed in the background quietly playing his role of mending broken relationships. He advised Clinton and his aides to adopt a soft view on the issues. This led to the trip's success.

It is true that the Americans kept their promise. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, Clinton tried to make the trip a success so that the Prime Minister's status would improve in the country, and long-standing problems could be solved in an atmosphere of goodwill. Rao's visit was successful beyond expectation.

India had thought that the two big problems of Kashmir and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be secondary, and the financial agenda would be on top. If this is so then its expectations were dashed. The nominated American ambassador had indicated this in his statement on India's nuclear and missile programs before America's Foreign Affairs Committee. Secondly America is still mingling with Pakistan, as became clear from President Leghari's trip immediately after Rao's visit.

New Delhi's nuclear program tops America's agenda. America is opposing India's "Prithvi" program, an issue made clear by Senator Hamilton (Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee) even before Rao's trip. Subsequently Wisner has repeated this before the same Committee. India has been threatened that it should think very carefully before implementing its decision on "Prithvi". This decision is very important because the ballistic missile is very different from a slow moving fixed wing airplane [as a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction]. If "Prithvi" is taken forward, there will be disorder in South Asia. That is why Washington has pressurized India to refrain from this program.

Washington's opposition is not new. Even so, Wisner's comment that the results of implementing the "Prithvi" program will not be favorable is certainly troubling. This contradicts the Prime Minister's assurance that America is not pressurizing India in any way.

When Rao was asked whether Clinton had twisted his arm, Rao replied, "My arm is absolutely alright, the President did not even touch it." In this way the Prime Minister changed the topic and left people guessing. Further guesswork was required when President Leghari said that President Clinton had raised the issue of the "Prithvi" missile program in his talks with Rao.

Undoubtedly Prithvi is capable of carrying nuclear weapons, but Wisner went a step further and commented, "America considers Prithvi to be only for nuclear deployment, which would be dangerous."

It became clear from his comment that New Delhi is worried about American feelings. This is also evident from the fact that the testing of "Prithvi", which was scheduled for early this month, was postponed. However this did not have any effect on Washington. Washington also stated that it would like India to promise to move ahead in the matter of nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. This is worrisome.

America's agenda is clear. It wants to end India's indigenous missile program because it must stop nuclear proliferation, whether it is from imported technology or built indigenously.

China is not endangered by "Prithvi" since it cannot reach beyond Tibet. But Pakistan could be in danger because of it. That is why Wisner has assured Pakistan that America will try its best to remove this uncertainty.

Pakistan is unhappy about the success of Rao's America trip. President Leghari had said that he would obtain America's assistance in solving the Kashmir issue. America did not say anything about this. All Clinton said was that both nations should sit down together and solve the problem.

What troubles us is that America did not discuss with Pakistan its encouragement of terrorism in the Kashmir

valley. All Clinton said was, "There are some people in Pakistan who are helping terrorists. We will keep an eye on the situation."

In this way, instead of questioning President Leghari, Clinton has given Islamabad liberty to carry on a clandestine warfare. Clinton said that they had received reports that Pakistani military supplies to Kashmiri terrorists had decreased. On this India's foreign-policy expert commented that if it were India instead of Pakistan, it would have been strongly censured.

Further, Washington also decided to accord a high status to Leghari's personal American visit. It was also stated that for a friendly nation such as Pakistan there should be no illusions regarding Rao's visit, and also that the Clinton administration will not make any vague promises at the expense of Islamabad.

From Pakistan's point of view, Leghari's visit could not have been better timed. He had arrived there on May 20 for his son's graduation ceremony, and he took full advantage of this opportunity for his country. He also stated that America was their friend. Even though Leghari did not achieve anything concrete, some facts were revealed nevertheless.

One, America's still has the same old attitude towards India and America, and it leans more towards Pakistan. Leghari's trip was a green signal for America-Pakistan talks, which was about non-proliferation and territorial security. Benazir Bhutto confirmed this during her visit to Kathmandu last week.

Now the issue before India is clear. Clinton has granted China "most favored nation" status, separating the human rights question from trade. From this it is clear that America considers its economic interests foremost.

Based on this, New Delhi will also need to strengthen India's situation with its economic base as a top priority. Will America accept this? The fact is that India is not China. China does not have a hostile neighbor like Pakistan. In terms of trade, India is nowhere close to China. Besides this, America would like to view India, Pakistan and China equally.

We have concluded that there is a wide chasm between India and America in terms of security and defense strategy. India must convince America that the "Prithvi" program is appropriate for its defense capability. India must proceed in a way that the new friendship is not hurt.

U.S. Colonialism Left Unchecked

94AS0303B Jaipur RAJASTHAN PATRIKA in Hindi
3 Jun 94 p 8

[Article by Balraj Mehta: "How Successful Was Rao's Trip to America"]

[Text] Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's trip to America proved to be a strange experience. Such a trip

cannot normally be expected of any head of state. Its goals remained personal and secret and results are questionable. The American media did not consider it an important event and ignored it. The equivalent Indian media, which can be manipulated at will, has deemed it extremely successful. This was explained by saying that it had been feared prior to the trip that India's general interests would be compromised, but now it can be claimed that we escaped this fate. However this alone is not enough reason to praise the Prime Minister's trip. Nobody has stated that a single benefit has accrued from Rao's America trip. Therefore, to say that Rao's America trip has raised his status is to hide the truth. The notion that Rao actually addressed the Indian community in America is in itself worrisome. This notion belongs to those people who are satisfied with the results of Rao's America trip. Such a viewpoint cannot be considered correct, and misconceptions regarding Rao's trip remain. This line of thought does not engender confidence in the purpose and intention of the trip.

The notion is being preached that Rao's visit to America must be considered in two parts. First, the visit has highlighted agreement in regard to economic relations; both nations have agreed to open their markets to the other and to collaborate in areas of high technology. Second, disagreements have also clearly surfaced. These disagreements are with regard to Kashmir, human rights and nuclear nonproliferation. In reality this is not the proper evaluation of the truth.

New Partnership

How appropriate is it to differentiate between agreement and disagreement in this manner, in the context of the claims of a new partnership between India and America? All issues under consideration, whether financial or political, should be considered as a whole and viewed simultaneously so that the direction and nature of Indo-American relations can be determined meaningfully. The reality is that America paid no attention at all to India's popular consensus. America is not at all concerned with what the Indian populace thinks about economic and political issues. India's administrators are increasingly following the American way so American politicians may be pleased in both economic and political matters.

The political issues include the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the Kashmir situation, and India's status in South Asia. With respect to India-Pakistan relations in South Asia, the American administration had clarified its anti-India position even before Rao's visit. The same applies to economic issues as well. Along with issues like intellectual property, the opening of India's banking and insurance industry to the Americans, and the entry of Americans into India's cotton fabrics market are also being debated. Even while these issues are pending, America has been threatening sanctions against India under Super 301. Rao did not protest strongly against this and went to America. He was ready to talk to America on their terms. In this way the bargaining

ability of the Prime Minister of India was reduced in a planned manner even before his visit. Therefore it was no mere coincidence that Rao had to adopt a difficult position during his visit to America. He did not have any other option.

This became clear during the joint press conference. This press conference was organized after a forty minute discussion between Prime Minister Rao and President Clinton. Actually this press conference was obviously President Clinton's, who was clearly delineating America's position in regard to India. He also shed light on other issues concerning the American administration. During the press conference, all that Rao said or was allowed to say was that America did not put any pressure on him, and that Clinton did not twist his arm. He said that his arm was all right, and Clinton didn't even touch it. Clinton was very happy with whatever Rao said, and very soon thereafter the press conference was concluded, and Clinton took Rao's by him arm into the private chamber of the White House.

Many do not have the courage to refute those who praise or wish to praise Rao's trip to America and say that Rao did not let America twist his arm. They should understand, however, that America has achieved expertise in the art of arm-twisting. It is not necessary for it to clearly display use of force. Rao's supporters could not have ignored the fact that when Clinton laughed at India's allegation that Pakistan encourages terrorist activities in Kashmir, Rao did not have the courage to refute him. He expressed his disagreement only when he was talking separately with the Indian press. The Indian media has published and broadcast with great faith the belief of governmental sources that Rao did not bend before America since he did not agree with Clinton on the nonproliferation treaty issue. When Clinton said that there has always been a difference of opinion, Rao stood silently next to him. In doing this he exhibited unnecessary rectitude. Clinton tried to make it clear that America wants India to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty because alternatives for its security are available, or can be arranged. In this context he referred to Germany and Japan. This was an open invitation to India to accept America's protection for its security and abandon its nuclear development program. It is important that before meeting Clinton Rao had already met America's defense minister and had agreed in principle to military cooperation between America and India. He had also agreed that America would help in the maintenance and modernization of India's defense industry. In this connection there is a proposal to prepare a detailed memorandum. Clearly this is a significant initiative in accepting American protection in the defense area. As far as Kashmir is concerned, Rao has agreed to talk to Pakistan on the basis of equality. In the present context, this would mean that America will also participate in such talks. How far Rao has compromised on the economic and political issues will only be revealed after some time.

Enthusiasm for Investment

It is remarkable that the American enthusiasm to invest billions of dollars in India is intended to synchronize political agendas towards India. To expect multinational companies to work for India's interests in America is a joke. All that can be expected from them is that they will come to India on their own terms and these have become increasingly exacting in the past three years. They have also been allowed to repatriate their investment. The security of the real estate they build in India has also been guaranteed. Whatever high profits they earn through this real estate will become a permanent source of their income and they will be able repatriate this income. Therefore to think that Narasimha Rao has invited foreign investment from America as a symbol of friendship is to fool oneself. The notion is not true that the basis of friendship between America and India is that both believe in democracy and free economy. Those who say this themselves admit that they and Narasimha Rao only represent the perspective of the upper class. Some people are even proud that they are different from the common people and that they have no connection with the oppressed and poverty-ridden populace of India.

The manner in which Indo-American relations are shaping up cannot be separated from the changes that are taking place in the Indian economy. Administrators' priorities are changing for this very reason. This began in the middle of 1991, along with a program of structural improvements in the Indian economy guided by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Then the GATT was signed recently. Narasimha Rao's government gradually began abandoning those policies on which India had stood for a long time. The political and economic issues that used to cause national concern became secondary.

Corruption Encouraged

Under these circumstances it is no coincidence that the interests of foreign powers are becoming important and necessary to the rulers in India. This has become even clearer after Rao's trip to America. The rulers have become dependent on the American administration on the political level, and on multinational corporations on the economic area, and want their support. For this they are adopting familiar methods. Experience indicates that by taking this approach they will only encourage corruption and destruction. If the evolving circumstances are not properly understood, it will be a massive blunder by the Indian political parties. The manner in which socio-economic policies are changing and politics is turning towards a new colonialist dependence is worrisome. Rao's America visit has further increased the common people's worry. There is a small class of people in Indian society that delights in talks of globalizing Indian economy and politics. Narasimha Rao is praised as a representative of this class. This class is completely cut off from the hopes and expectations of the Indian populace. This class of people does not even hesitate to sell our national sovereignty. The independence we have

gained after a long struggle is today in question. The issues that have arisen after Rao's trip are serious and full of danger.

Exported Software, Services of Great Value

94AS0313D Bangalore DECCAN HERALD in English
1 Jun 94 p 13

[Text] New Delhi, May 31 (PTI)—India has registered software and software services exports worth Rs. [Rupees] 1,020 crore in value terms during 1993-94 despite recession in the United States and other major importing countries.

Stating this here today, the President of the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), Mr N.R. Narayana Murthy, said the industry had also managed to register a turnover of Rs. 1,715 crore, a 47 percent growth rate, compared with 1992-93.

A NASSCOM release, quoting a study conducted by it, said during 1993-94 more than 100 companies exported over Rs. 1 crore each worth of software, against only five firms in this category five years ago.

The study also says in the last financial year, about 15 firms exported more than Rs. 15 crore worth of software, as opposed to just three companies in this category in 1991-92.

The NASSCOM Executive Director, Mr Dewang Mehta, said in a statement that the software industry had brought in foreign exchange to the tune of \$330 million during 1993-94 and had generated a higher rate of employment.

Software exports have steadily grown from Rs. 175 crore in 1989-90 to Rs. 1,020 crore during the last financial year. The industry registered a 51 percent growth rate in exports during 1993-94, compared with the previous year.

The NASSCOM said during the last financial year, the industry had a turnover of Rs. 695 crore, against Rs. 490 crore in 1992-93, a growth rate of more than 42 percent.

This figure, however, does not include the large volume of in-house software development undertaken in the country and also the systems software, which is packaged with hardware.

Kashmir, Punjab Situations Compared, Contrasted

94AS0313E Madras THE HINDU in English
1 Jun 94 p 12

[Text] Much has been written on the Kashmir problem since it originated and naturally so. It is a major insurrectionary movement to Independent India after what had happened in the northeastern States and Punjab. While the movements in those areas have been subdued, it is still raging in Kashmir. It seems strange in a way that in a democratic setup when democratic spaces are available, such insurrectionary and militant movements

should arise. But on a little deeper reflection it becomes obvious that political vested interests manoeuvre these democratic spaces and hardly any democratic channel is left effective for people's legitimate grievances to be expressed.

The same story was repeated in Kashmir as well. I do not want to repeat all that as much has been written in newspapers and magazines. Suffice it to say that the way the Central Governments, specially those of Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, dealt with Kashmir considering it their pocket borough clinched the issue and the youth of Kashmir rise in insurrection. A democracy can succeed anywhere only when the rulers show democratic sensitivity towards the aspirations of the people and this sensitivity has to be much more heightened if the people have different ethnic origin as in the case of the north-eastern States or in Punjab and Kashmir.

Kashmir is and will remain an integral part of India but the same cannot be taken for granted forever. The people of Kashmir chose to be part of India at a time when they could have easily opted for Pakistan in 1948 when the tribals invaded it. They had displayed great faith in Indian democracy and secularism by opting for it and rejecting the Islamic nationalism of Pakistan. However, except for a few initial years we did not prove worthy of this trust reposed in us by the people of Kashmir. We eroded their autonomy and trampled on their legitimate aspirations. Its culmination came when the duly elected government in Kashmir was dismissed through democratic manipulation. The Kashmiri youth could take it no more and revolted. This insurrection was supported to the hilt by the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) of Pakistan.

Here we would like to compare what happened in Kashmir with the happenings in Punjab. There are interesting parallels though not all the way. Kashmir and Punjab have their specificities also. Punjab is also ethnically different, but not so different as Kashmir but nevertheless different. In both the cases, not only ethnicity but also religion happens to be different. In Punjab, Sikhs are in a majority and Hindus in minority, whereas in Kashmir, Muslims are in a majority and Hindus in minority (we are speaking here more particularly of the Kashmir valley rather than the J&K State as the problem lies mainly in the valley). In Punjab as well as in Kashmir, both the communities—majority as well as minority—share the same ethnicity. Sikhs are of the same ethnic stock as of the Hindus and in Kashmir, Muslims and the Kashmiri Pandits as well come of the same ethnic stock.

Again, both in Punjab and Kashmir, despite differing religions, ethnic integration was of a high order until the beginning of militancy. In Punjab, of course, Sikhism was much closer to Hinduism in terms of religious and cultural ethos. In Kashmir, the two religions may not be as close, but Kashmiri Shaivism is monotheistic like Islam and there was not much religious conflict between the two. Culturally, of course, Kashmiri Muslims are as close to the Hindus as the Sikhs are to the Hindus in Punjab.

However, there has been one big difference. During partition, Punjab was divided and all the Punjabi Muslims migrated to the Pakistani side of Punjab leaving no Muslim population there. In the case of Kashmir, it was not so. It was not divided as part of the partition plan. The Kashmiris, on the other hand, as pointed out before chose to stay with India but it got divided on account of tribal invasion from the Pakistani side. Just as during partition there was Hindu-Sikh solidarity, there was Hindu-Muslim solidarity in Kashmir on the eve of Pakistani invasion. As Sikhs had spurned Jinnah's offer to join the Pakistani movement, the Kashmiri Muslims too rebuffed him under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah.

However, east Punjab was integrated with India unconditionally and Kashmir accepted its accession on the condition of acceptance of its autonomy and the Centre keeping with it only three subjects. Kashmir would enjoy all the residuary powers. It is also worth noting that it was Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir who insisted on inclusion of Article 370. There was no agitation among the people of Kashmir to that effect. However, once it was agreed to and incorporated, it became part of the aspirations of the people of Kashmir.

In both the States grievances were building up for varying reasons. In Punjab also the ruling Congress frustrated the efforts of the Akalis to come to power. The Congress, through manipulation, tried to remain in power. Ideally, any party in a democracy has a right to appeal to the people for coming to power but no party should tamper with the democratic processes to remain in power. It does not and cannot go well with the people and one day their anger bursts out in a violent form. The Congress tried to prevent the National Conference from coming to power in Kashmir too. This attitude bred resentment in the minds of the people in Kashmir as well as in Punjab. In Kashmir there was an additional factor: detention of Sheikh Abdullah for a long period, almost for a decade. Needless to say, this had an adverse impact on the minds of the Kashmiris.

In Punjab, the success of the green revolution created new ambitions in the minds of rich kulaks. They wanted to invest their surplus in industries. The revolution of rising expectations can create difficult problems. When these expectations were not fulfilled, people felt alienated, especially those with vaulting ambitions. Also, the success of the green revolution made enough surplus available for the rich peasantry to send their wards for higher education. But those who came out of universities did not find enough jobs in cities and they were unwilling to go back to rural areas. These "unemployed" youth became more and more impatient and willingly joined the militants.

In Kashmir, though there was no green revolution comparable to that of Punjab, the apple revolution did create a measure of affluence among a small section of Kashmiris giving rise to a revolution of rising expectations. Also, education expanded in the last few decades creating more unemployed youth leading to frustration.

They felt more and more alienated with the passage of time. The problem was further complicated since an aspiration for "azadi" already existed there for quite some time.

In Punjab, militancy increased greatly due to violation of the sanctity of the Golden Temple. It would not have lasted there that long but for the Bluestar operation. Nothing of the kind happened in Kashmir. During the Hazratbal event the Government was restrained and did not allow the military to launch any operation at the most sacred place in Kashmir. Any misadventure by the authorities would have set Kashmir ablaze once again. The Central Government seemed to have learnt a lesson at least in this respect from Punjab.

There is another crucial factor which needs to be taken into account in this comparative perspective. The ISI of Pakistan helped the militants in both the States. But in Punjab the help dried up either because the Benazir Government stopped it for her own political reasons or because the ISI realised the hopelessness of the Punjab case and got rid of it treating it as a liability. It is not so in case of Kashmir. For Benazir it is a matter of a political survival. She is hardly likely to restrain the ISI from training the Kashmiri youth or sending them arms and ammunition. The Pakistani Government had no such high stakes in Punjab. Arming the youth in Punjab was only to harass India, but in Kashmir it is much more than that. It has a claim over it. Thus the Kashmir problem will not be as easy to solve as the Punjab problem. In Punjab, the so-called militants had greatly degenerated and their ranks were infiltrated by smugglers and criminals. This does not seem to have happened in Kashmir as yet. The Kashmiri youth is much more motivated by the "azadi" slogan than the Sikh youth for Khalistan.

IRAN

Cooperative Efforts With Pakistan Detailed

94LA0186B Tehran SALAM in Persian 19 May 94 p 3

[Text] News Service. The eighth meeting of the Joint Economic Committee of Iran and Pakistan concluded its work yesterday (Wednesday) in the presence of Engineer Torkan, the minister of roads and transport, and "Vasim Ja'fari," the economic adviser to the prime minister of Pakistan by signing a note of understanding. [quotation marks as published]

According to a report by the public relations office of the Ministry of Roads and Transport, this note, which has been agreed upon by both sides, states: Road building and the building of highways, especially 1300 km of roads, will be done by Iranian construction companies, and it is supposed to reach tangible results in the next two months. Also, the issue of building the Kerman-Zahedan-Mirjaveh-Koviteh railroad, with joint cooperation and by making use of each other's technical and financial capabilities as well as use of international

financial resources, is one of the projects that can have regional and intercontinental impact.

This report adds: The second passenger train between Zahedan and Koviteh to facilitate the traveling of pilgrimage and tourist passengers was agreed to by both sides. Air services between Koviteh and Zahedan and Lahore and Mashhad were also among the items agreed upon.

Based on this report, customs facilities expected by passengers is another important issue about which the decision was made that the customs of both sides would propose the necessary implemental methods in a joint meeting. Also, the development and expansion of trade services and credit facilities were among the main issues discussed, and the decision was made to prepare the grounds for the expansion of trade between the two countries.

Also, industrial and technical issues, the building of joint refineries and a natural gas pipeline, and the production of parts for vehicles and tractors were among the other important issues at the meeting.

Government To Pay 600 Billion Tumans in Subsidies

94LA0186F Tehran SALAM in Persian 23 May 94 p 2

[Text] Mashhad, (IRNA)—The minister of the interior said: The government will pay 600 billion tumans in subsidies for essential goods this year.

Mr. Mohammad Besharati said in the seminar of the political and security deputy governors-general of the country in Mashhad on Sunday: Of this figure, 200 billion tumans have been allocated for bread and 60 billion tumans for pharmaceutical subsidies.

He said: The offices of the governors-general are the centers for political organization of the provinces, and the political deputies of the provinces determine the political line of the provinces.

The minister of the interior added: The political and security deputies of the offices of the governors-general must evaluate the problems of the society with a keen eye.

He considered security as the essential backbone of the society.

In the two-day seminar, issues relating to the security of the borders and also narcotics smuggling will be examined and discussed.

Median Retail Price of Selected Foods in Tehran

94LA0186I Tehran SALAM in Persian 24 May 94 p 4

[Text] According to a report by the Central Bank in the week under report, the price of unpasteurized yogurt, cheese, and powdered milk increased, but the price of pasteurized butter did not change significantly. Eggs are sold at 1,700-2,200 rials [R] per tray, the price of which increased significantly compared to the previous week. The price of Thailand rice showed an increase, but the

price of other kinds of rice decreased. In the legume group, the price of chick peas and kidney beans increased, and the price of the remainder of the items decreased. Grocery stores stationed in the squares under the supervision of the City Hall sell legumes at about R220-380 lower than the price of a similar variety in the stores throughout the city.

In the week under study, the squares under the supervision of the City Hall sold fruits and fresh vegetables of appropriate quality at the rate of the Fruit and Fresh

Vegetable Organization of the city of Tehran. Fruit sellers throughout the city offered premium fruit and fresh vegetables, among which the price of Lebanon-seed apples, premium oranges, sweet lemons, eggplants, and zucchini increased, and the price of green plums, watermelons, tomatoes, and chicken decreased.

The price of various types of red meat increased, and chicken decreased. The open-market price of sugar cubes, sugar, tea, and shortening increased.

Chart Comparing the Average Price of Some Fruits in the Week Ending 23/02/1373 [13 May 1994]

Name of Goods	Unit	Government Price	Average Price Per Week			Percentage of Change in Price of the Current Week Compared to the Week	
			Current	Previous	Compared to Previous Month	Previous	Compared to Previous Month
1. Dairy products						2.1	5.0
Unpasteurized yogurt	Kg		629	624	609	0.8	3.3
Premium Iranian cheese	"		3,930	3,913	3,924	0.4	-0.1
Domestic and imported pasteurized butter	"		5,479	5,486	5,227	-0.1	4.8
Powdered milk	Can	240	7,613	7,100	6,791	7.2	12.1
2. Eggs						5.2	0.6
Eggs (per tray)	About 2 Kg		1,933	1,837	1,921	5.2	0.6
3. Rice						0.4	3.0
Imported (Thailand) rice	Kg	100	898	874	837	2.7	7.3
Imported (other) rice	"	100	1,233	1,240	1,219	-0.6	1.1
Domestic premium Sadri Rice	"		2,124	2,146	2,113	-1.0	0.5
4. Legumes		Price of City Hall markets				0.4	1.1
Chick peas	Kg	900-1,000	1,197	1,193	1,171	10.3	2.2
Split peas	"	1,100	1,350	1,375	1,378	-1.8	-2.0
Lentils	"	1,400	1,783	1,790	1,755	-0.4	1.6
Kidney beans	"	800	1,018	993	1,023	2.5	-0.5
Black-eyed peas	"	1,350	1,634	1,664	1,689	-1.8	-3.3
White Beans	"	650	885	895	895	-1.1	-1.1
Red Beans	"	630	1,000	1,005	1,046	-0.5	-4.4
5. Fresh Fruit						4.7	5.2
Red Lebanon-seed apples	Kg	600	1,100	1,037	1,227	6.9	-10.4
Yellow Lebanon-seed apples	"	550	1,017	918	927	10.8	7.2
Premium oranges	"	800-1,000	2,013	1,855	1,920	8.5	2.8
Lower-grade oranges	"	550	1,036	1,061	1,189	-2.4	-12.9
Premium tangerines	"						
Sweet lemons	"		825	726	687	23.3	30.3
Green plums	"	700	1,837	1,967		6.6	
Pears	"						
Pomegranates	"						
Grapes	"						

Oblong melon	"						
Cantaloupes	"	350-500	859				
Watermelon	"	250	380	408	333	6.9	14.1
6. Fresh vegetables						1.4	10.5
Cucumbers	Kg	500	925	924	762	0.1	21.2
Tomatoes	"	350	423	677	702	37.5	39.7
Eggplants	"	350-400	753	593	377	27	99.7
Zucchini	"	250	554	380	235	45.8	65.4
Potatoes	"	230	298	290	238	2.8	25.2
Onions	"	200	340	435	855	-21.8	-60.2
Green beans	"	550-600	891	935	988	-4.7	-9.8
Leaf vegetables	"	180-200	351	353	427	-0.6	-17.8
7. Red meat		Government price				1.0	-0.6
Mutton and goat meat with bones	Kg	770	7,059	6,962	7,022	1.4	0.2
Boneless beef and veal	Kg	770	6,936	6,200	6,322	0.6	-1.5
8. Chicken						-4.3	-4.2
Chicken	Kg		2,373	2,479	2,477	-4.3	-4.2
9. Sugarcubes and sugar						3.8	8.2
Sugarcubes	Kg	27.5	1,498	1,442	1,402	3.9	6.8
Sugar	"	27.5	1,323	1,287	1,215	2.6	9.7
10. Tea						12.0	9.7
Mixed tea (500-g package)	Package	750	1,077	962	982	12.0	9.7
11. Shortening						4.5	4.1
Vegetable shortening	2.5 Kg tins	264	13,789	13,196	12,252	4.5	4.1

PAKISTAN

'Secret Talks' With U.S. Questioned

94AS0308B Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 12 May 94 p 5

[Editorial: "America's Secret Talks With India and Pakistan"]

[Text] The United States is still holding a series of secret talks with India and Pakistan over the nuclear programs of the two countries. The U.S. demands from both nations are different in nature. Secret talks are being held between India and the United States in London. The question of how to verify the halt in making nuclear materials was also discussed in this meeting. There were three phases of these talks, however, the results were not satisfactory. The reason for the failure was declared to be the lack of confidentiality. After this was revealed, further secret talks are being held in London. This question was raised in the Lok Sabha and the usual answer was given that India will be ready to sign the NPT only when it is accepted by all nations and no discrimination is practiced.

It is said that the Indian and U.S. points of view over the nuclear non-proliferation have become so similar that the United States has understood the Indian stand that it

cannot be complacent about its defense because its neighbor China is a nuclear power. Thus, the United States has wavered from its earlier stand and is proposing expansion of regional system to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to include the five nuclear powers as well as Germany and Japan. In other words, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, United States, Japan, and Germany will get together and agree on something. The Rajiv [Gandhi] government had proposed in the past that the plan should aim to make the whole world nuclear-free. The Narasimha Rao government's proposal for the seven nuclear powers to hold talks looks better because it can be the first step for making the whole world nuclear-free. However, India wants the assurance that this agreement will be extended and Israel, Iran, and Kazakhstan should also be asked to sign it. It should also be made clear that the position of all the nations signing this agreement will be equal and all the signees will have equal responsibilities to follow this agreement. The situation should not be where some signees are given some flexibility and others have to follow it strictly. One block in the way of making the climate conducive to cooperation in this agreement is Kashmir, the biggest reason for dispute between India and Pakistan. This block needs to be removed.

Meanwhile the JANG correspondent in Islamabad has let it be known that quiet diplomacy between Pakistan

and the United States has started and they are discussing capping Pakistan's nuclear program. High-level officials of U.S. State department and Pakistan embassy in Washington have talked within the framework of the results of Strobe Talbott's visit to Pakistan. The United States expressed the desire during these contacts that Pakistan give it definite assurance that it will not use the elements already prepared for making atomic bombs and will not increase the level of enriching uranium.

We have [here] presented a montage of the news about the secret U.S. negotiations with India and Pakistan that filtered to the newspapers through diplomatic sources. These sources also revealed that the United States is not practicing equality or balance in its separate talks with India and Pakistan. It is willing to discuss in details the principles of an international level agreement with India. It is however, putting pressure on Pakistan to assure it of capping its nuclear program.

It is simple. Just like the United States recognizes the Chinese danger to India and is not making immediate demands [on India], it should also recognize the danger India is posing to Pakistan, and should hold talks with Pakistan at the same level as with India. It is obvious that this issue cannot be taken care of while keeping China out. We must recognize the fact that China has veto power just like the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. Therefore, negotiations with China over the nuclear issue would be between equal powers. The negotiations get stuck at India's demand that whatever agreement is made must be implemented impartially on the United States, China, India, Germany, North Korea, Israel, Iran, Kazakhstan and other nuclear powers in the world. None of them should be considered superior than the others and given special treatment and none be considered smaller and pressured. The United States should give up its irresponsible attitude that the countries that have already made atomic bombs are more responsible and can be trust for discretion in using them, and the countries that are planning to make atomic bombs are irresponsible and cannot be trusted in its appropriate use. Only the United States has used the bomb for destruction so far; no other country has done that. Therefore, based on its record, the United States is the most irresponsible nuclear power. It should not be playing the role of the leader in this area. Until the United States agrees to end its nuclear role, opens its nuclear installations for inspection, and agrees to destroy its whole nuclear arsenal under international supervision, its sincerity about stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be questioned, and the smaller nations will not be willing to accept its high-handedness.

U.S. Consul General Cited on Inflammatory Statements

94AS0307C Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 19 May 94 p 8

[News Report: "Government Ignored U.S. Consul General's Anti-Pakistan Statement"]

[Text] Hyderabad (JASARAT Correspondent)—The Pakistan Muslim League (N) has condemned the statements issued by the U.S. Consul General in a meeting held in Hyderabad. Concern was also expressed that the government did not take notice of these anti-Pakistan statements. In a meeting, which was chaired by Nawab Zamiruddin, they condemned the government's recent actions which stopped the death penalty from being carried out in public and removed the right of the police to take action against anyone who insults the Islamic religion. Strange reasoning was presented about the decision made by the Majaz Court. The present government is trying to trample on religious principles by taking both these steps. Pakistan's Muslims will never accept this, because what the Prophet said is pious, and whenever a person is sentenced to death, it is required that a large group be present, so that everyone can learn a lesson from it. As for the person of the Prophet, it should be remembered that Muslims love him more than their own lives. The fact is that these steps are part of a campaign to "free Islam." Therefore, this meeting strongly demanded from the government that both these steps be taken back, so that the restlessness, concern, and sorrow felt by the people is alleviated. At the same time, religious scholars are also being requested to play their historically important role in stopping these actions against Islam.

U.S. View of 'Political Islam' Said Changing

94AS0323B Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Jun 94 p 3

[Editorial: "United States and 'Political Islam'"]

[Text] There was a time when the United States thought that it would be able to eradicate 'political Islam' with the help of various governments. However, experience has proved it to be wrong. Islamic movements in Iran, Sudan, Algeria, Turkey, and other countries have shown their power and superiority. Now they are saying in the United States that it is not possible to crush these movements and we must find moderate leaders of these movements and deal with them. Following this new idea, the United States is establishing new relations with Iran. A deputation of editors of American journals recently toured Iran. Before this, the United States expressed its pleasure at Iran's policy during the Gulf war and its support in getting the kidnapped American and European persons freed. The United States also likes President Hashmi Rafsanjani's market economy policy. However, there is still a wide chasm between the United States and Iran, and the United States will have to make many changes to fill it. It is already trying to do that. For example, the United States contacted the Sudanese government and invited its Islamic leader Mr. Tarabi to the United States for discussions. The United States is busy in important talks with the Sudanese foreign minister. The U.S. ambassador in Khartoum is trying to get an agreement between the Sudanese government and the Christian rebels in southern Sudan. Similarly, it has admitted about Algeria that there is no alternative but to let the Islamic factions to take over the government. One

U.S. assistant secretary, Horuk Perez, told the U.S. Congress that the Algerian Islamic movement has local roots and it is wrong to say that it is getting help from Iran. The leaders of Islamic Nijat Party, the real party behind the Islamic movement, do not like terrorism. They are fully successful and still want a political solution. The Western political analysts say about Egypt that President Hossaini Mubarak's government will not last long since it is a corrupt government that lacks national feelings. The people in the Islamic movement groups want a democratic government that could make them proud. This led to the U.S. officials and high-level administrators starting to express their opinion about Islamic movements in a different tone. Many important statements were issued in the month of May. These included a speech delivered by Robert Peleastro, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, in a conference on Islamic affairs in the Middle East. Mr. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security advisor, also discussed the issue of Islamic extremism on 16 May. In the 2 May issue of *The TIME*, excerpts from late President Nixon's book were published. He said that if we stayed out of and ignorant of, the turmoil raging in the Muslim society, there will be major confrontation between the West and the Islamic world. Statements by U.S. government officials, analysts, and intellectuals have been issued before this claiming that the United States has nothing against Islam, and that fundamentalist countries like Saudi Arabia have always been friends of the United States. However, 'political Islam,' is a different issue and it worries the United States. The success of Islamic movements in Ankara and Istanbul—Turkey's centers of Western culture—has shaken up the United States. It can be said with confidence that the Islamic movements have passed the first phase and have entered the second phase where all international powers are forced to recognize them. They not only have to accept them but also deal with them. That is why Islamic movements and their leaders are being scrutinized to see which of them are good candidates for negotiations to protect U.S. interests. This phase is more testing and difficult for the Islamic movements, especially because they have to avoid divisions between so-called moderates and extremists. The fact is that moderation and extremism are textbook definitions. When there is a serious war or confrontation, even the moderates appear to be extremists. Later, when the burden of responsibilities is to be carried after the victory and real facts have to be faced, even extremists become moderates. The extremism that is discussed in relation to Islam is the one resulted from our religious scholar's isolation. However, when the Islamic leadership is in the corridors of power, it will be very different from religious places and schools. Therefore, extremism is not a dangerous thing in itself. If it is dangerous then it is because of the specific situation created by the Islamic governments that are puppets in the hands of imperialists. If these Islamic movements are provided a democratic means to grow, they will demonstrate moderation, appropriateness, friendliness, and affability. However, by stopping them by force and forcing artificial leadership on the Muslims, the United

States would be encouraging terrorism. The United States has begun to feel that it is useless to control 'political Islam' by dictatorial and corrupt rulers. The United States has lost this struggle. This new U.S. broad-mindedness about Islamic movements will be realized only when it gets rid of the prejudice of the Christians in Europe and its double standards. Unfortunately, hatred of Muslims is rampant in European history and culture, and this has also effected the United States. It is the prejudice of the European brotherhood that does not want to include Turkey in their group. There is no other country as faithful to the West as is Turkey. This is the attitude which is felt by the Muslims in the whole world. They feel that the Western standards for the Muslims have been antagonistic and this was openly visible in Bosnia. Therefore, if the United States wants to view Muslims, the Islamic world, and Islamic movements from a new angle and wants to stop a clash between the West and the East, it must get rid of the Christian prejudice that is prevalent in Europe.

Government Urged To Counter Indian Nuclear Threat

94AS0323A Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Jun 94 p 3

[Editorial: "India's War Preparations"]

[Text] The news that India has started work on making hydrogen bomb and is going to launch Prithvi next week is very alarming. These missiles will be installed on India's borders and will be able to target various Pakistani cities. India is already a nuclear power and now wants to increase its military might by making hydrogen bombs. India's increasing nuclear capability and military power definitely creates concern in Pakistan because the tension between India and Pakistan has increased because of the Kashmir issue. This serious and sensitive situation calls for Pakistan to be prepared for its defense so that it can response to a sudden attack by India. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao has made it clear during his recent trip to the United States that he will continue his obdurate stand on Kashmir and the nuclear issue. India will not give up its inflexible stand. In this situation, Pakistan should also give up its apologetic attitude.

Article Calls For Worldwide Islamic Revolution

94AS0323C Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 5 Jun 94 p 3

[Article by Al Mohammed Rizmi: "Islamic Revolution Needed Now"]

[Text] Islam is a comprehensive, exhaustive, and cosmopolitan religion. In order to solve the problems of this suffering world, enlighten the troubled religious atmosphere with the lamp of unitarianism, make faith more important than materialism, and give new hope to all the deprived, the suppressed, and the enslaved in the world we must have an Islamic revolution. It will be possible

only when we understand Islam and its real meanings, declare Islam as the main goal of our lives, and invite others to join Islam.

The Prophet said, "We pave the way for those who want to join our path." The word revolution is defined in the dictionary as "changing" or "turning upside down" or "removal." Revolution generally means bringing about change in government by using force.

However, the real meaning of revolution is totally changing the social system and overhauling it. In other words, it changes all the spheres of life that have been corrupted because of our contact with external forces and reshapes it into the Islamic form of life and rebuilds life according to Islamic principles and faith.

When we look at the present religious, social, economic, and political conditions, we perceive the importance and need for an Islamic revolution. The capitalist system has created socialism and communism because of an inevitable historical process. That is what has been written in the story written by Karl Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse Tung about the betterment of humanity. If this "story" had anything to do with reality, the United States and other Western nations as well as the communist nations would have experienced social, economic and spiritual changes. However, the eye of the history shows us that the greatest symbol of communism—the Soviet Union—has disintegrated. Meanwhile, the economic and the social systems in the United States and Europe are bound so strongly with the ropes of consumerism, dollars, and pounds that there is no hope for the oppressed groups. The economic structure of the United States and Great Britain has been destroyed, and the hold of religion in Western nations non-existent. Their system has no room for spirituality. The fatal diseases born from the womb of the western culture have corrupted the character of people in the whole of Europe, ruined the law and order situation, and given rise to factionalism and prejudice. There is not a ray of hope for the oppressed. Among the oppressed, the most import group is the African race (black skinned people) in the United States. These are the people who are called Negroes with hatred. These are the very people on whose blood and sweat American culture was built. The history of exploitation of the African-American population is full of atrocious and extreme actions.

The main religion in the United States is Christianity, however, the Jews rule the country. There is a large number of Jewish members in the U.S. Senate and the Congress, and they make the U.S. government do whatever they want. The people of the United States and Europe have understood the fact to an extent that there is no solution to the racial prejudice in their culture now. In England, they have factional prejudice and differences, and in the United States they have the war between the blacks and whites. In the United States the situation in most cities is like this: If a black tenant finds a room to rent in a white area, the whole neighborhood is torn down. The white fear for their lives if they go

through a black community. In some places, even the police cannot go in. Nudity, obscenity, lawlessness and open use of drugs will not resolve the problems Europe is facing. They need a system that can solve their problems. The solution to the problems faced by these weak communities is Islam. If the people in the West give up prejudice and narrow-mindedness and study Islam's teaching and the Koran, the original source of these teachings, then they will learn that only Islam can influence their lives in an elated manner and a total revolution in their lives is possible only by the Islamic revolution. Islam does not try to improve one part of life; it effect every aspect of life round the clock. Most of all, once a man gains this wealth of faith he tastes the sweetness of having a purpose in life. Every man gets an identity, a sense of responsibility, and the joy of hope. It is the duty of every Muslim to adopt to Islam fully, invite others to join Islam, and try to bring about the Islamic revolution. Every man has the desire to be good, and if he gets the opportunity to hear the truth, he will adopt the path of truthfulness. Mankind is surrounded by sins from all sides and the feeling for sin is either missing or covered under the heap of dirt. The specialty of Islam is that it gives new life to a person and uplifts him even from the worst condition. Arabia was drowned in ignorance when the founder of Islam, Hazrat Mohammed Mustafa, started the Islamic revolution there. There was neither a regular government nor a legal system in Arabia. There were some perception of character and manner among these people, but it was basic and coarse in nature. They were partners in all the ignorance and abominations that were common in the whole world at that time. These included worshipping idols, spirits and stars. The founder of Islam taught them the philosophy behind his religion, laid the foundation of Islamic kingdom, Islamic economic system, social system and character, got them out of the darkness of ignorance, and put them on the path to light and knowledge. Since the first century of Hijira, Allah's chosen people have been continuously trying to spread faith, Allah's name, and duty in the whole world. These chosen few include Sayyed Jamaluddin Afghani, Sayyed Qutab Saheed, Sayyed Mohammed Qutab, Husanalbana Saheed, Sayyed Abualala Mowdudi, and Imam Khomeini. They spent all their lives for spreading the Islamic revolution. Iran's Islamic revolution is one of the revolutions that gave light to the dark world. The scholars of this period admit that the Islamic revolution has been happening secretly in some, if not all, countries during the second half of this century. This revolution has been working against capitalism, tyranny, and materialism. However, the Islamic revolution was not so wide-spread and effective anywhere as it was in Iran. This revolution changed Iranians into the follower of this one religion. All the factions there are joined by the religion now. The mosque there is just the home of Allah, and not the property of a religious group. The Islamic revolution helped form a government of the people and now there is no difference between the people and the government. They have full democracy there and no martial law is needed. There have been necessary and revolutionary

changes in textbooks in order to coordinate the university system according to the Islamic and Koranic teaching. Vulgar movies encouraging removal of veils and obscenity were replaced with movies that encourage Islamic education. The practice of not using veil and nudity among the Muslim women was stopped and replaced by the use of veil. They helped even the woman coming from abroad to live behind the veil. The support given to Islamic movements in Palestine, Bosnia and other parts of the world is the result of the Iranian revolution. The secular world of the West which refused to recognize the political power of Islam had to bow down to it. Those who considered Islam an obsolete religion are openly thinking about the revolutionary teachings of Islam.

Fake Currency Said Printed by Hekmatyar

94AS0324B Peshawar MASHRIQ in Urdu 27 May 94 p 8

[News Report: "Hekmatyar Printing Counterfeit Currency"]

[Text] Kabul (PPI)—Afghanistan's prime minister, Gulbadan Hekmatyar, has started to print counterfeit currency in printing press established in Cheharsayab. The Kabul Radio referring to a local magazine said that Hekmatyar established a printing press at his residence in Cheharsayab recently. This machine was imported from Germany and a foreign expert posing as a journalist is running it. The report said that 1,000 afghani bills are printed on this machine. These bills, however, are not very clear. According to informed sources this machine was installed with the help of a heroin smuggler.

Kashmiri Jihad Leader Interviewed on Movement

94AS0308A Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 2 Jun 94 p 31

[Sayyed Manzur Shah Interviewed by Arif Bahar; date and place not given]

[Text] Commander Manzur Shah is one of the original leaders of the Kashmir jihad. He entered politics from journalism and then moved on to militancy. He travelled the difficult path of pen to Kalishnikov very bravely. He was the commander in chief of the Islamic movement. Later, this organization was absorbed by several other organizations and a new organization called Jumiatal Mujaheddin was established. The Jumiatal Mujaheddin is a very active and important organization in the Kashmir valley. Manzur Shah is one of its top leaders. Recently, he was appointed the leader of the United Jihad Council formed by 13 organizations as a joint command. We are presenting our interview with him to our readers so they can learn about the valley which is the Caravan of jihad, and the significant changes occurring there.

[Bahar] Is the Muttahida Jihad Council [United Jihad Council] (MJC) an operational unity or just a political one, and which organizations have joined it?

[Manzur Shah] The MJC is a coalition of major military organizations in occupied Kashmir. Some organizations have folded and new ones have emerged. However, every group that has a role in the jihad is a member of this council. There are 13 organizations, including well-known and major ones, in the council at this time. This Jihad Council is the only representative forum of the freedom fighters against the Indian military. It was formed to provide the opportunity to various freedom fighters organizations to sit together and plan a joint war strategy. This Jihad Council includes Hezbul Mujaheddin, Jumiatal Mujaheddin, Al-Jihad, Al-Barq, Ikhwatul Mussalmin, Tehriqul Mujaheddin, Harkul Insar, and other organizations in its membership. Only the [Jammu-Kashmir] Liberation Front [JKLF] has not joined it. No action is taken against India using the Jihad Council platform; only policy is formulated here. Goals are established for various organizations, which they have to meet. The Jihad Council's name is not used so that it is not considered a 14th organization. Various organizations are involved in different activities.

[Bahar] Many intellectuals in Kashmir and Pakistan are making noises that Srinagar will become another Kabul. Has such a situation really developed?

[Manzur Shah] Those who talk about Srinagar becoming another Kabul do not know anything about Kashmir's jihad. Afghanistan was an independent nation and interference by Pakistan or any other country was not appropriate there. However, Kashmir is a part of Pakistan from legal, historical, geographical, and constitutional perspectives. The reason for which this sub-continent was divided calls for Kashmir to be a part of Pakistan. That is why this jihad was started. The declarations of all Kashmiri militant organizations have announced Pakistan is their ideal and goal. According to this goal, if the freedom fighters take even one inch of land, it belongs to Pakistan. The freedom fighters will surrender to the Pakistani military and government. There will no reason for fighting when Pakistan takes over here. There will be a civil war if international powers join India to make Kashmir an independent nation. In this situation, Kashmir could become another Kabul. However, organizations there have ideological differences, while the people of Kashmir are with Pakistan. The foreign powers that are encouraging the idea of an independent Kashmir are paving way for a civil war.

[Bahar] Rajesh Pilot and Dr. Farooq Abdullah are busy starting a political process in Kashmir. Can they succeed in their goal?

[Manzur Shah] India has always claimed that the jihad movement would be crushed in six months. However, the jihad has been getting stronger, instead of weakening. The mujaheddin have developed the capability to destroy even ordinance depots in their military cantonments. The Jumiatal Mujaheddin made the largest Indian cantonment living hell for them. The mujaheddin are getting organized now and are attacking the Indian military strategically. India tries to give the impression

that this movement has become weak. This is a white lie. This impression was nullified by the Hazratbal incident, destruction of the military cantonment, and razing of several camps in southern Kashmir. The mujaheddin are getting stronger in Jammu now and they are spread all over the valley. India wants to start the political process through Farooq Abdullah and Ghulam Rasul to show the world that the civilian administration and the people are involved in the government. Wali Mohammed would not have been assassinated and the caravans of Farooq and Rajesh Pilot would not have been attacked if the climate was conducive to political action. They could have been able to meet with the people and walk openly in the streets, however, this is not possible, because the mujaheddin still are controlling Kashmir.

[Bahar] However, Rajesh Pilot did have a public meeting in Kupwara.

[Manzur Shah] He had that public meeting attended by central government employees, CRP, and Border Police employees dressed as civilians. This was not a public meeting. What is worse, state employees also refused to attend this meeting and held their own meeting. There were about 50-60 people. That many people are always around a central minister as a protocol. We cannot call it a public meeting.

[Bahar] It did not happen in the past.

[Manzur Shah] The situation is still the same. They used to implement curfew when Indian official visited here and now they have curfews in any area they visit. The go there with thousands of soldiers in tow. Obviously, the people cannot fight the army. When the people are surrounded in their homes, you can hold public meetings if you so desire. What difference does it make? The real thing is the opinion of the people.

[Bahar] What is the truth about the drama of surrender by the mujaheddin at Rajesh Pilot's meeting?

[Manzur Shah] They were Kashmiri-speaking Pandits who were coached by the Indian military. Many of them were recognized. The Pandit young men were given the weapons that were confiscated from the mujaheddin. They were presented as mujaheddin. If the real mujaheddin began to surrender, who will the people depend on? The people of Kashmir are tolerating these atrocities because of the support of the mujaheddin.

[Bahar] Farooq Abdullah has announced the establishment of a private military called the "National Guard." Is this a simple threat or are they taking action on it?

[Manzur Shah] The national Conference and the Congress party are sitting in Bombay and Calcutta with their vote banks. They are a handful of people and what kind of army can these battered people build and how can they fight the mujaheddin? However, "The National Rifles" under the Indian military's supervision is being organized to give the impression to the world that this is a local militia and not the army. These are actually

regular commandos who have gone through very rigorous training for two years.

[Bahar] Recently, the All Party Huriat Conference visited Delhi. Political observers declared it a significant development. Was there anything behind the scenes?

[Manzur Shah] The Huriat Conference is a controversial forum. Its deputation visited Delhi to discuss division of Kashmir. The deputation also recognized Hindu leaders. These leaders included: Karan Singh, Bhim Singh, Bhushan Bajaz, P.N. Jalali, Saiful Din Sauz, and Tariq Abdullah. These people want to sit in India and organize a conference in Vienna as per the U.S. wishes. They are trying to divide up Hindu, secular, and pro-India leaders with the help of the United States and Indian Muslims so that they can be presented as Muslim leaders and have them make the decisions that they want. Pakistan will be told tomorrow to accept the decision of these Hindu leaders and talk with those you have already recognized. The Hindu leaders, however, say that the Jammu region should be declared a Hindu state. They do not care whether the valley is independent or divided.

[Bahar] Are not you paving the way for dividing Kashmir by negating the political rights of the Hindus?

[Manzur Shah] There is no question of negating the Hindu leadership. The question is of their leadership. All these people are without any representation. The Hindus are not with them. They have worked for the Congress and other Indian governments and this is their standard. We tell the Hindus to come to their homes and accept the decision of the majority. Since the Hindus are a minority and do not constitute a majority anywhere in the valley, they have to assimilate. We cannot allow the making of an India in every little village and hamlet and for them to fly the tri-color flag!

Demand for Sharia Law Analyzed

94AS0307E Karachi TAKBEER in Urdu 26 May 94 pp 5-6

[Editorial: "Demand for Enforcement of Sharia in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan"]

[Text] The people living in the four districts of the Malakand division have faced great difficulties for many years. In the past, when small kingdoms and divisions were established here, there was a Sharia system for centuries with religious courts under it. The administration of affairs here followed Sharia laws, and everything was run peacefully and appropriately. When the small counties were eliminated, the former legal system was also brought to an end. But since this area was isolated and not under the influence of the British legal system, it was decided that PATA rules would be used rather than regular laws. In other words, the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) regulations (PATA) was started. In 1985 Maulana Sufi Mohammed, a religious scholar of the Dair district, identified the unfairness of

these regulations and demanded the implementation of Sharia laws here. This led to a major campaign against the PATA system.

PATA regulations were also challenged in court, and the Supreme Court declared these regulations unfair. As a result, they have been suspended. After this success came the demand to replace these with sharia laws. The people have been demanding implementation of Sharia laws here. It is the general impression that after suspending PATA regulations, the government will expand Pakistan's civil laws to the Malakand division also. The leaders of the civil disobedience movement believe that Pakistani civil laws do not differ much from PATA regulations. Both are equally atrocious and unfair, especially in that the poor cannot get justice from them. Since these people have experience in Sharia laws for a long time, it is appropriate that they be allowed to administer these laws there. The government, however, has been procrastinating.

In this situation, representatives of the Malakand division met at the school run by Maulana Gohar Rehman, former president of the Jamaat-i Islami of Sarhad. They have initiated an organized effort to oppose secular laws and support the implementation of Sharia laws. The group had given notice to the government that Sharia laws should be implemented by 11 May in order to fill the legal void in the Malakand division. Otherwise, the people will be forced to come out into the streets to show their opposition.

Before the deadline set for this notice, Dr. Mohammed Yaqub Khan, deputy chairman of the Jamaat-i Islami of Sarhad, and the representatives of the Malakand division warned the government, demanding that the president use the right given to him in the Constitution and implement Sharia laws immediately. The state office of the Jamaat-i Islami called a press conference at the party's central office and identified the person who wanted implementation of Sharia laws in the Malakand division. They demanded that before the situation worsens, the government should know that it is not the demand of the people only, but also of all the political parties.

Later, a 36-member deputation of the Jamaat-i Islami of Sarhad met with President Farooq Leghari in the latter's house on 10 May, discussing with him the issue of implementing Sharia laws in the Malakand division. They demanded that the laws of retaliation be expanded to the Malakand division. The president disappointed the deputation by taking the stand that he was unable to do anything, because the Parliament must pass special laws to implement Sharia laws (Daily JASARAT, Karachi, 11 May 1994). The deputation representing this movement also met with Aftab Sherpao, the chief minister of the state. He agreed with the deputation in principle, but did not help them.

Afterwards, Maulana Sufi Mohammed, the leader of this civil disobedience movements, announced that they will take an oath on the Holy Koran that the Sharia laws will

be approved for their region. He said that no one would return to his home until the Sharia laws were effected. He, along with thousands of supporters, has been sitting on the highway in Malakand since the morning of 12 May, awaiting some action. He said, "We are asking the Muslim rulers to use Allah's laws in the Malakand division, nothing more. We are willing to make any sacrifice for this, and we are not willing to allow the government any leeway on this issue."

The government of Pakistan has not taken any notice of this movement; however, the BBC has reported that tribals, numbering between 25,000 and 30,000, have barricaded a road and are pressuring that their demands be accepted. As a result, the districts of Boner, Sawat, Dair, and Chitral have lost contact with the state capital of Peshawar. Tents are seen everywhere, and people stay there even in the cold and rain. The local administration is talking with the demonstrators; however, this has not been effective, because a decision can only be made at the highest levels.

The four assembly members elected from this region have requested of President Farooq Leghari that he take action soon; otherwise, the situation could worsen. These four assembly members have supported the implementation of Sharia laws and have said, "When the people want implementation of Sharia laws, they should not be stopped." They said that Jamaat-i Islami leaders have met with the president, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the governor, and the chief minister, and presented their demands to them. "All of these people agree totally to the implementation of Sharia laws; however, we do not understand why the government refuses to implement the laws, or why it is taking so much time doing so."

On 11 May, members of the Tehrik-i Nifaz Shariat Mohammedi closed the major highway at Bat Khela. The number of people coming from far-flung areas to Malakand is on the rise. In addition to closing down the major highway in the Malakand division, the demonstrators have also initiated sit-ins on other roads. They have barricaded Sawat-Boner Road at Bari Kot, Shangapar Road at Sawat, and Agra Road at Malakand Agency. They have also closed roads at Durgai and Shehadkot in Malakand Agency. The demonstrators say that if their demands are not met, they will close other roads. Tribals from Bajura and Malakand Agency have also joined this demonstration. According to a government guess, there are 30,000 demonstrators camping on the roads; however, the leaders of the movement claim there are over 100,000 demonstrators.

The Fazalul Rehman Group of the Jumiat-i Ulema-i Islam and Jamaat-i Islami parties that support the government have promised total support for the demonstration. There have been meetings in Mardan and Peshawar in support of this movement, and people are coming here from there to join the demonstrations.

The demand for implementation of Sharia laws and the great support it is getting are proof of the fact that the people of this country are fed up with secular laws and want them to be replaced with Sharia laws. The fact is that secular laws and the court system have caused a lot of unrest among the people. They are tired and fed up of these laws and want to live peacefully, following Islamic laws. But our rulers are totally ignoring these desires.

We advise the government to meet these demands without any delay and take practical steps to give satisfaction to the people involved in this movement. If they do not do so, then some major crisis could occur at any time.

Division of Sindh Into Two States Encouraged

94AS0307B Karachi AMN in Urdu 29 May 94 p 3

[Article by Ikhlaq Farooqi: "Movement to Divide Sindh: Atrocities and Exploitation Continues"]

[Text] Over ten million mohajirs [Urdu-speaking immigrants from India who immigrated in 1947] in Sindh decided in the last three elections that they consider the MQM [Mohajir Quami Movement] their only representative party. Democracy consists of respecting the decision made by the people. Therefore, it behooves the rulers to respect the decision made by the mohajir people. But the political parties professing support for democracy are proving that they do not pay much attention to the interests of the people, and that they do not care much for the interests of the nation, either. All they love are their own personal interests and those of their party.

After the 1988 election, a lengthy discussion was held, and after a written agreement was made, the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government included the MQM in the government. However, the result of the delay and procrastination in implementation of the agreement's conditions was that cooperation and collaboration did not last between the two parties for even a year, and the MQM left the government. After the 1990 election, and after discussion and a written agreement, Mian Nawaz Sharif and Jam-i Sadiq included the MQM in the state and federal governments. This cooperation lasted for about a year and a half. Then the MQM members resigned from Assembly and Cabinet positions, as the Mian Nawaz Sharif government had started military operation against the MQM. During the 1993 elections, the MQM boycotted the National Assembly elections but participated in state Assembly elections with full zeal. It also participated in the Senate election. It won more than 25 percent of the state Assembly seats, and sent in two senators. After this election, a presidential election was held, in which the MQM supported PPP candidate Farooq Leghari, who won. Later, when the chairman of the Senate was selected, the MQM voted for Muslim League candidate Wasim Sajjad. He also won the election.

It was expected that serious discussions would take place between the MQM and the PPP about collaboration and

cooperation, and that, as a result of these discussions, the MQM would be included in the government. This would have made the government a representative, democratic government in a real sense. The PPP, however, was not serious about negotiations, and democracy lovers not only considered the present state government unrepresentative, but also undemocratic, because there is no representation of urban areas in the assembly.

Newspapers and all the political parties advised the government repeatedly to resolve this political appropriately, by holding talks with the MQM. General Abdul Waheed, chief of army staff, also said the same thing. However, the operation against the mohajirs is still taking place, with political and economic censure continuing. Therefore, the mohajirs are thinking about dividing Sindh, and are talking about having a separate state. Just as they are demanding a Saraiki state in Punjab, a Pakhtoon state in Balochistan, and a Hazara state in Sarhad, they are rallying for a separate state in Sindh also. It has also been learned that they are demanding the division of Sindh into two states—one rural and one urban—so that the people of urban and rural areas have full economic and political rights in the administration.

The PPP is opposed to the division of Sindh and the creation of a separate state there. However, the atrocities against the mohajirs continue, and they are being deprived of political and economic rights. Therefore, there is no alternative but to divide Sindh. If the political and economic exploitation of the mohajirs does not stop in Sindh, then they will be forced to campaign for a separate state there. If this movement is started, it will be impossible to crush it. Our political history tells us that whenever a movement starts in Karachi it does not fail, and it takes little time to succeed in its goals. Since the MQM was established, it did not support the division of Sindh, and it has been trying to encourage peace, prosperity, and progress in Sindh. It appears that some forces have taken this route of exploitation, forcing the MQM to demand division of Sindh. They are avoiding discussion and collaboration efforts.

We have also learned that the forces which feel the division of Sindh is unnecessary are presenting the new idea of making Karachi a federal area, so that they have a counter-proposal against that of a separate state. We can say confidently, however, that the mohajirs will not accept this proposal. Therefore, putting Karachi and the surrounding area under federal administration will not resolve the political and economic problems faced by over ten million mohajirs settled in Sindh. In addition, the representation of mohajirs in the Sindh assembly will also be limited. With all this in view, and for the greater interest of our nation, it is imperative that we accept the political and economic demands of the mohajirs. If this system of procrastination continues and leads to a movement for a separate state, then even after all the MQM's demands are accepted, the movement will not stop until there is a separate state.

Proposals To Educate in Regional Languages Viewed

94AS0307D Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 19 May 94 p 3

[Editorial: "Education in Mother Tongue"]

[Text] President Farooq Leghari has expressed the need to teach the mother tongues of Punjabi, Saraiki, Pushtu, Sindhi, and Balochi to students in the primary levels. He was a guest of honor in a ceremony in the Punjab school in Lahore Township, Lahore. The advice given by our president regarding use of the mother tongue is the same as that given by many educational experts these days. We cannot ignore it; however, we should not accept it in a hurry, either. There are many aspects that require thought. First, parents do not send their children to school to learn their mother tongue. Their desire is that they learn Urdu and English. Second, by dividing our educational system by ethnic differences, we will encourage ethnic division in our country. Ethnic unity is important for our nation and the government, and our educational administration will not be in a good position to encourage every educational system to advertise and educate in a separate mother tongue. The number of mother tongues is unlimited [as published]. There are many languages in the northern area. Baruhi, Makrani, and Gujurati are also the mother tongues of some. India is experimenting with this [education in regional languages] and is sorry for having done so. The biggest problems are in employment and business. When a family moves from one state to another, the children have a hard time finding schools where their mother tongue is taught. At present, in the larger cities of India, Marathi, Hindi, Telugu, English, Malayalam, and Kannada are taught in one city. Thus, the ethnic groups prepared in one city will not have the same mentality. In our educational system, English and Urdu already make a great impact. The addition of mother tongues will only cause problems for the students and their parents. It would be better to teach mother tongues in the higher

grades, and it would be a good idea if all ideological, practical, and administrative aspects of the system are fully considered. For example, can we find trained teachers to teach mother tongues? Will students and parents accept this new system, or will they reject it and admit their children to English-medium schools? Are books written in these mother tongues available? How many languages can a child learn? It is important for them to read the Koran. Urdu is the national language, and English is an international language. Parents are not ready to give up any of these languages. In their opinion, education means that children can read the Koran fluently [in Arabic], are able to read and write Urdu with ease and have a working knowledge of English. They will need this at every step of their lives.

Air Force Said Upgrading T-37 Fighters

94AS0307A Karachi AMN in Urdu 11 May 94 p 8

[News Report: "T-37 Fighters Being Reconditioned"]

[Text] Risalpur, 10 May (PPA)—All the T-37 planes being used by Pakistan's Air Force are being reconditioned as part of a program called Life Enhancement. A senior official of the Pakistan Air Force Academy reported that the reconditioning work will be done in Risalpur. The air frames of these fighter planes will be strengthened to last 26,000 hours instead of 8,000. Under this project, experts in the Pakistani Air Force will recondition one fighter plane each month. The Air Force will get the necessary tools and machinery from the United States of America soon. The first T-37 training fighter plane was given to Pakistan's Air Force in 1963. In 1975-76, additional planes were given to the PAF. In response to a question, the officer said that the 20 T-37 fighter planes leased from the United States of America have not been permitted to fly since February of this year. The United States did not extend the lease. He said that 25 T-37 fighters were used to train cadets in the academy, and that every cadet has to fly 120 hours. Afterwards, they can fly other jet fighters.

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